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VINDICATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST THROUGH THE
COURTS: A COMPARATIVIST'S CONTRIBUTION*
MAURO CAPPELLETTI"

INTRODUCrION

D evices for representing public and group interests in civil litigation,
whether already in existence or merely proposed, have frequently
been analyzed in their legal, economic, social, and political aspects.'
* Copyright © 1976, Mauro Cappelletti.

** Professor of Law, University of Florence and Stanford University; Director, Institute of Comparative Law of the University of Florence; D. Jur., University of
Florence, 1952.
This article is adapted from the James McCormick Mitchell Lecture delivered by

the author at the Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, -State University of New York at
Buffalo, on November 20, 1975. The study has been prepared within the framework
of a research project on "access to justice" and the "quality of justice" in contemporary
societies, conducted at the Florence Center of Comparative Judicial Studies under the
sponsorship of the Ford Foundation and the Fondazione G. Agnelli of Turin, and at
the Florence Institute of Comparative Law under the sponsorship of the Italian Research Council.
The author wishes to acknowledge that the subject matter of this article also
represented the theme of both a lecture on "La protection d'int6rats collectifs et de
groupe dans le proc~s civil-M6tamorphoses de ]a proc6dure civile," delivered at the
Spring 1975 Session of the Socit6 de Legislation Compar6e (published in 27 Revue
Internationale de Droit Comparg), and a general report on "Formazioni sociali e interessi
di gruppo davanti alla giustizia civile," presented at the Semi-Centenary Jubilee Congress of the University of Florence School of Law on May 10, 1975 (published in 30
RIVISTA DI DIRnTTO PROcESSUALE

361

(1975)).

A close connection in contents and

form of the three studies was unavoidable. Also, a more detailed comparative analysis
of some of the problems treated in this article appeared in the author's general report
to the Ninth International Congress of Comparative Law (Tehran, September/October
1974), based on 26 national reports representing each of the world's major legal
families. This general report is published in Cappelletti, Governmental and Private
Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 MICH.
L. REv. 793 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Study] and in M. CAPPELLETTI
& J. JOLOWICZ, PUBLIC INTEREST PARTIES AND THE ACTIVE ROLE OF

THE

JUDGE IN

CmvuL LrrOATION 5-153 (1975) (Milan/Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., Giuffr /Oceana Publications).
Finally, the author thankfully acknowledges the generous help in the form of discussion, criticism, and advice in the preparation of this article from a number of
friends and colleagues, and particularly from Professor Adolf Homburger of the Faculty
of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buffalo, as well as Professors
Guido Calabresi of Yale University, William Cohen and Jack Friedenthal of Stanford
University, and John McCoid of the University of Virginia. Robert Bush and Bryant
Garth, two recent law graduates of Stanford University, are also thanked for their
invaluable linguistic, editorial and research assistance.
1. Understandably, not even the behavioral aspect has been neglected. See Sedler,
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Some writers have discussed the "economic justification[s] of the class
action"; 2 others have demonstrated the vital importance of "public interest law," and especially the class action, as a tool to equalize the
parties in litigation; 3 still others have analyzed the legal significance of
developments in the area of public interest representation in one or
another particular country, 4 especially the United States where such developments have been most advanced and meaningful.5
I do not intend to add to these efforts. Instead, I will' try to indicate and analyze needs and trends which are apparent at the larger
scale of macrocomparison. Utilizing comparative analysis, this article
will begin with the recognition that some basic socio-economic and
political needs are shared by all advanced societies and, on this premise,
will examine the "legal answers" given to those common needs. It will
focus especially, but not exclusively, on the civil law "half" of the
world, with particular emphasis on Continental Europe. Yet, I am confident that fundamental similarities with legal problems and developments in the common law world, especially in America, even though
often merely implicit, will readily become apparent. Indeed, the civil
law experience and its problems can provide a relevant message for
common law lawyers, particularly in view of the 'heated debate in the
Standing, Justiciability and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479

(1972).
Much too little research exists, in contrast, concerning the quantitative aspects of
public and group interest litigation. For preliminary research along these lines, see
SENATE Commss. ON COMmERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CLASS ACTION STUDY (Comm.
'Print 1974), especially at 1-2; cf. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of
Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 300 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Adler, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 538-43 (1972); Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class
Actions, 21 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969). See generally R. POSNER, ECoNobac ANALYSIS
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co.). The
OF LAW 343-53, particularly at 349-50 (1972)
reasons supporting the move from individual to class actions are similar to those
adduced by Professor Calabresi in justifying the move from voluntary negotiations
(property rules) to collectively determined rights to damages (liability rules). See
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-11 (1972).
3. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
'of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 143, 150 (1974). See also Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litigation, 9 LAw & Soc'y REV. 347 (1975).
.
4. See Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of
America, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Private Suits], also published in A. HobsaUROER & H. K6TZ, infra note 5, at 9-68.
5. There is also a very valuable, recent bilateral study covering the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United States: K6tz, Klagen Privater im 8ffentlichen
Interesse, in A. HOMBURGER & H. K6TZ, KLAOEN PRIVATER IIt OFFENTLICHEN INTERESSE 69-102 (1975) (Frankfurt am Main, Metzner Verlag) (Volume 68 of the series
"Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung.")

VINDICATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1976]

United States concerning representation of the public interest in civil
litigation.
I will not elaborate further on the relevance of a comparative
analysis of this kind. Suffice it to say that if a legal trend is apparent
in all, or most, of the countries which have reached a roughly similar.
state of cultural, economic, and social development, then there must
be compelling reasons for such a common trend. If the need at the root
of that trend, far from being the ephemeral expression of a passing
situation, is a lasting and growing one, then even such value-ladenconcepts as "progressiveness" or "backwardness," "justice" or "injustice," can be objectively measured against the milestone of such a trend.
Comparative analysis, in short, can and should provide one more
measuring unit to probe the validity, utility, and "justice" of legal
developments in a given place or country-for instance, the validity,
utility, and "justice" of the restrictions on class and public interest
litigation recently imposed by the Supreme Court of the United States.6
I. AN

EMERGING, GROWING, AND LASTING NEED OF MODERN

SOCIETIES, AND ITS REFLECTIONS IN THE

FIELD

OF CIVIL LITIGATION

Our contemporary society-or, to use a more ambitious term, our

civilization-is frequently characterized as a "mass production-mass
consumption" civilization. That characterization reflects, no doubt, a
typical feature of modern economies in all parts of the world-"massification." But this feature extends far beyond the economic sector; it
6.

See, in particular, Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973),

which held that in a class action suit for which the federal $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement was applicable, each of the unnamed (as well as the named)
members of the class had to satisfy the requirement; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974), which held that rule 23 (c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that individual notice be sent, at the expense of the plaintiff, to al class
members who can be identified through reasonable effort. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), which rejected the doctrine that a
prevailing public interest plaintiff, as a "private attorney general," may be awarded
attorneys' fees against the defendant, must also be regarded as part of a trend against
public interest lawsuits, either by a class or an individual. Finally, public interest litigation is adversely affected by standing barriers affirmed in various Supreme Court decisions. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (which denied standing
to a citizen and taxpayer challenging, on constitutional grounds, the statutory accounting procedures of the Central Intelligence Agency); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (which similarly denied standing to citizens,
taxpayers, and army reservists challenging, on constitutional grounds, army reserve
membership by congressmen); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (which denied
standing to groups challenging a zoning law on the ground that they were excluded
by its provisions from living in the community). This trend is discussed generally in
Comparative Study at 798-800, 852-56.
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characterizes social relationships, feelings, and conflicts as well. For
example, consider the emergence and growth of such phenomena, practically unknown in pre-industrial societies, as the massive organization
of labor, the unprecedented dimension of class conflicts, the rise of the
mass-oriented "welfare state" government, and the often frightening
development of a mass psychology molded by modem mass media.
This "massification" is perhaps best exemplified by the present
"urban explosions" in a growing number of countries. As Arnold Toynbee, the great British historian, wrote a few years ago:
This development . . . is part of one that is world-wide. The
megalopolises on all the continents are merging to form ecumenopolis,
a new type of city that can be represented by only one specimen,
since ecumenopolis is going, as its name proclaims, to encompass the
land-surface of the globe with a single conurbation.
The open question is not whether ecumenopolis is going to come
into existence; it is whether its maker, mankind, is going to be its
master or to be its victim. Are we going to succeed in making the inevitable ecumenopolis a tolerable habitat for human beings? 7
Faced by such fascinating, yet dangerous, social phenomena of
gigantic and universal dimensions, the law, as an instrument of social
order, must undertake tasks unknown in previous times. More and more
frequently, because of the "massification" phenomena, human actions
and relationships assume a collective, rather than a merely individual,
character; they refer to groups, categories, and classes of people, rather
than to one or a few individuals alone. Even basic rights and duties
are no longer exclusively the individual rights and duties of the 18thor 19th-century declarations of human rights inspired by natural law
concepts, but rather meta-individual, collective, "social" rights and
duties of associations, communities, and classes. This is not to say that
individual rights no longer have a vital place in our societies; rather,
it is to suggest that these rights are practically meaningless in today's
setting unless accompanied by the social rights necessary to make them
effective and really accessible to all. Thus, a modern bill of rights,
national or international, would protect not only the traditional individual rights (essentially requiring non-interference by governmental
authorities with the private sphere of the individual), but also the
new social rights which essentially require active intervention by the
state and other public entities.8 Among these social rights are freedom
7. A. TOYNBEE, CITIES ON THE MOVE 196 (1970) (London, Oxford Univ. Press).
8. See, e.g., Cappelletti, I diritti sociali di liberta, in PRoCEsso E IDEOLOOIE
511-24 (1969) (Bologna, I1 Mulino). One particularly important example is the Pre-
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from indigency, ignorance, and discrimination, as well as the right to a
healthy environment, to social security, and to protection from massive
financial, commercial, corporate, or even governmental oppressions and
frauds.
Indeed, more and more frequently the complexity of modem
societies generates situations in which a single human action can be
beneficial or prejudicial to large numbers of people, thus making
entirely inadequate the traditional scheme of litigation as merely a
two-party affair. 9 For example, false information divulged by large
corporations may cause injury to all who buy shares in that corporation;
an antitrust violation may damage all who are affected by the unfair
competition; the infringement by an employer of a collective labor
agreement violates the rights of all his employees; the imposition of
an unconstitutional tax or the illegal discontinuance of a social benefit
may be detrimental to large communities of citizens; the discharge
of waste into a lake or river harms all who want to enjoy its clean
waters; defective or unhealthy packaging may cause damage to all consumers of these goods. The possibility of such mass injuries represents
a characteristic feature of our epoch.
As a rule, however, the individual alone is unable to protect himself efficiently against such injuries. Even if he has a legal cause of
action, other factors may preclude judicial relief: his individual right
may be too "diffuse" or too "small" to prompt him to seek its protection; excessive costs may obstruct his legal action in court; he may fear
the powerful violator; he may even be unaware of his right. It is necessary to abandon the individualistic, essentially laissez-faire, 19th-century
concept of litigation, a concept which awards the right to sue, if at all,
solely to the subject personally aggrieved in his own narrowly-defined
individual rights-for example, to the owner of a neighboring property
in a case of pollution or of a zoning violation. The new social, collective, "diffuse" rights and interests can be protected only by new social,
amble of the French Constitution of 1946, which was incorporated by explicit reference
in the Preamble of the present Constitution of 1958. It acknowledges that the addition
of new "social" and "economic" rights to the traditional civil rights is "particularly
necessary in our time." Among the new rights it affirms are the right to work and to
obtain employment; the right to health, material security, and repose and leisure for
children, mothers, and the old; the right of adequate means of support for those who
cannot work; and the right to education.
9. See, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocrETY 119-60 (2d ed. 1972)
(London, Penguin/Stevens & Sons); P. SAVATIER, LES Mi-TAMORPHOSES ] CONOMIQUES
ET SOCIALES DU DROIT CrM D'AuJouRD'HUI 28-30 (3d ed. 1964) (Paris, Dalloz);
Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D.

299, 308-10 (1973).
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collective, "diffuse" remedies and procedures. Indeed, the quest for
these new remedies and procedures is, in my judgment, the most fascinating feature in the modem evolution of judicial law.
II. META-INDIVIDUAL (DIFFUSE) INTERESTS AND THE
PROBLEM OF STANDING

Even though the newly emerged meta-individual rights and interests represent an undeniable and growing reality of all modern societies,
they still remain to a large extent alien to the schemes, concepts, and
fictions that play so large a role in legal processes. To start with-and to
use a Pirandellian formula10-- they are rights and interests "in search
of an author." Who "holds" them? And who has standing to sue for
their defense?
Traditional legal doctrine, especially in the civil law world, has
sharply distinguished substantive law and rights into "private" and
"public." "Private" rights are those which "belong" to private individuals, whereas "public" rights are those which "belong" to the general
public-the populus-represented by the state or Res publica.1 Consequently, the traditional doctrine of standing (legitimatio ad causam)
attributes the right to sue either to the private individual who "holds"
the right which is in need of judicial protection, or, in case of public
rights, to the state itself, which sues in court through its organs (usually,
the ministare public or Staatsanwalt,that is, the governmental attorney
general, who is the general representative of the state in litigation).12
Thus, the basic rule in civil litigation is that standing to sue belongs
exclusively to the private person who is, or is the legal representative
of,13 the holder of the right in issue,14 whereas in criminal litigation,
where a public (state) interest is always seen to be at stake, the "mo10. L. PIRANDELLO, SEI PERSONAGGI IN CERCA D'AUTORE (1918).
11. The Latin adjective publicus originates from populus-the people.
12. For a detailed comparative study and some historical information on the
ministre public, see Comparative Study at 800-37. The ministre public roughly corresponds to the American federal and state attorneys general and district attorneys.
13. E.g., the guardian of a minor or incompetent person.
14. See C. PRO. Civ. art. 81 (Italy); and especially H. SOLUS & R. PERROT, 1
DROIT JUDICIARE PRivi 249 (1961) (Paris, Sirey). Only in those exceptional cases
expressly provided for by law may a person who is not the legal representative of another, but who is qualified for "extraordinary" or "anomalous" standing, bring suit to
protect the other's rights. See, e.g., P. CALAMANDREI, 4 OPER GIURMICHE 131-33,
477-81 (M. Cappelletti ed. 1970) (Naples, Morano); H. SoLus & R. PERROT, supra,
at 216, 252.
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nopoly" to sue belongs to the ministrepublic.15 Sometimes a "public"
right can be the subject matter of civil litigation as well, as is the case
in incompetency and certain matrimonial proceedings. In these exceptional cases, the ministate public also has standing to commence, or
to intervene in, civil litigation, since the state is viewed as the "owner,'.
6
or one of the "owners," of the litigated right.1

This "proprietary" concept of rights and locus standi is very clear

and simple in the civil law tradition-indeed, much too simple to reflect present realities. The Classic Roman summa divisio between
"public" and "private"' 7 has become, as incisively stated by a British

observer, 8 a "mighty cleavage" with no connecting bridges-or intermediaries-between the two aspects of the dichotomy: the individual

and the state. Today's reality, however, is much more complex and
pluralistic than that abstract dichotomy: between the individual and the

state there are numerous groups, communities, and collectivities which
forcefully claim the enjoyment and judicial protection of certain rights
which are classifiable neither as "public" nor "private" in the traditional sense.' 9
As we have seen, modem societies bring to the forefront new

rights and legitimate interests-a newer kind of "pr6perty"-which,
although not "public" in the Roman and Civilian sense of the word

(that is, belonging to the Res publica or state) , are collective or diffuse;
in the sense that either they do not "belong" to any individual in

particular, or that individuals own only an insignificant portion of them.
Who is the "owner" of the air that we breathe? The ancient concept of

the right (or standing) to sue as the monopoly of the sole person or
persons to whom the substantive right in issue "belongs" appears hardly
applicable to those "rights without a holder" that belong, at one and

the same time, to everyone and to no one.20 Indeed, a rigorous applica15.

See, e.g., Bihl, L'action "syndicale" des associations, 93

GAZETTE iU PALAS,
524-26 (1973): "[T]he State, represented by the ministOre public,
is the only collectivity recognized by a penal law profoundly rooted in individualism."
Id. at 525.
16. See, e.g., C. PRO. Civ. arts. 69-70 (Italy).
17. See especially DIGEST 1.1.1.2 (Ulpianus).
18. T. E. Holland, cited by J. MERRYmAN, THE CiviL LAw TRAsDOioN 99 (1969)
(Stanford, Cal., Stanford Univ. Press).
19. See notes 139-54 infra and accompanying text.
20. Rights without a holder should be distinguished, of course, from those rights
which do belong to specific individuals, but which are too small to prompt their individual holders to act for their protection (e.g., many consumer and social rights). However, from our point of view the two categories of the rights which are too small and the
rights which have no holder can be considered together. They present similar problems
insofar as their effective judicial protection is concerned.
DOCTRINE 523,
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tion of this concept amounts to a denial of "justiciability" 2' 1 of these
rights. Yet, it is precisely the struggle for the protection of such "newer
property"-the struggle, to pursue the above example, for the conservation of clean air-that represents one of the major challenges of
all legal systems in industrial societies. To deny the justiciability of
collective and diffuse interests-as courts in many countries, to a large
extent, still do,22 including the United States Supreme Court in its

recent crusade against public interest litigation 3 -may well be the
logical and rigorous consequence of a concept that attributes the right
of action only to the "holder" of the substantive right in issue. Such a
denial, however, represents an offense to the most vital values and
exigencies of our epoch, since the protection of diffuse rights has become of crucial importance for the progress, perhaps even the survival,
of humankind. 24
III. Two

INSUFFICIENT ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEM OF STANDING
IN THE AREA OF DIFFUSE INTERESTS

The "proprietary" concept mentioned above, although still tenaciously prevailing almost everywhere, and especially in the civil law
world, is becoming less rigid in many countries. There is a growing
21. The term justiciability is used here in the general sense of access to judicial
protection. Of course, the connection between standing and justiciability is widely
recognized, even though the concepts are not interchangeable. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968).
22. For some typical recent examples from Europe, see Compaiative Study at
863-64 n.316 (Germany); Decision of July 14, 1972, No. 475, [1972] Foro Ital. III
269 (Consiglio di Stato) (Italy) (with a strongly critical note by A. Romano).
23. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 177-80 (1974). What is striking in these decisions is not so much the denial of
standing to taxpayers and citizens, but the strong language used, which indicates that
the liberalization of standing requirements in such previous cases as United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), is far from a peacefully accepted development. Indeed,
such liberalization is viewed by those later decisions, as an unwarranted expansion of
judicial power. See note 162 infra.
24. See Justice Douglas' powerful dissent in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975):
Standing has become a barrier to access to the federal courts, just as "the
political question" was in earlier decades.. . . [C]ases such as this one reflect
festering sores in our society; and the American dream teaches that if one
reaches high enough and persists, there is a forum where justice is dispensed.
I would lower the technical barriers and let the courts serve that ancient
need. They can in time be curbed by legislative or constitutional restraints
if an emergency arises.
Id. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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awareness in Europe that, no less than individual rights, collective or
diffuse interests must also be assured "access to court," and that the
narrow "proprietary" concept stands in the way of such access.
However, the stubborn tenacity of traditional schemes, concepts,
and fictions-in particular, the tenacity of the Roman summa divisio
between private and public-is apparent even in certain European
developments that represent a partial movement away from the rigid
tradition. Thus, while gradually abandoning the most conservative
approach, which would deny in toto access to judicial protection of
diffuse interests, many civil law systems have allowed standing to sue
either to any of those individuals who are "personally interested" or
to the state. In the first case, however, the private individual is allowed
to sue merely to vindicate his own interest-in particular, to recover
his personal damages-rather than to vindicate the interest of the entire
group, community, or class involved. We can speak here of the "individual standing" solution. In the second case, standing to sue has been
attributed to the traditional representative of the state in litigationthe ministre public or governmental attorney general. Here we can
speak of the "governmental standing" solution. Neither of these two
solutions, however, has proved adequate.
A. Standing Attributed to the Individual Directly and Personally
Injured
The "individual standing" solution is manifestly insufficient. If
the individual "personally aggrieved" is allowed to sue merely on his
own behalf, the diffuse interest in most cases will not find adequate
protection. Typical is the case of the consumer. On the one hand, the
individual consumer's personal interest usually will be too small to
encourage him to sue; on the other, even if a consumer occasionally
may have a sufficient interest to sue, the wrongdoer will not be sufficiently deterred by this suit from continuing his illegal activity. The
limitation of this solution is especially severe, and indeed insuperable,
since it is essentially an economic limitation, as is widely recognized
by recent writings in the area of law and economics. 25 Similar considerations hold true for other kinds of violations of meta-individual inter25. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 348-51; Note, The Cost-Internalization
Case For Class Actions, supra note 2. See also G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AcciDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 205 (1970) (New Haven, Conn., Yale Univ.

Press).
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ests, such as the many forms of racial, religious, and social discrimination, urban development abuses, and pollution.
B. Standing Attributed to the "Governmental Attorney General" as
the General Representative of the State
' The second solution, entrusting the right to sue to the govern-

mental attorney general, has also proved inadequate. Most Civilian
experts are in unison in denouncing the usual laxity and "passivity"
of the minist~re public or Staatsanwalt in performing his new tasks as

a defender of "collective interests," 26 and, more specifically, his failure
to bring to court such cases as those involving racial offenses,2 7 oppressive sales practices,28 or environmental violations. 29
The fact that these and similar matters are "too alien to the preoccupations of traditional justice"' '

-- too alien to the ministate public's

traditional role in litigation-is not difficult to understand. First, and
quite apart from historical reasons, 3 ' the governmental attorney general is too dependent upon the political branches of government to
act as an advocate against abuses which are frequently generated, or

at least deliberately tolerated, by political and administrative bodies.
This dependence is even stronger for the common law analogues to
the civilian minist~re public-the attorney general and district attorSee, e.g., Bekaert, La mission du minist~re public en droit priv, in 2 Mi LANGES
(Brussels/Paris, Bruylant/Sirey);
DE JEAN DABIN 419, 441 (1963)
Vigoriti, The Role of the Ministgre Public in Civil Proceedings: Italy, in ITALIAN
26.

EN

L'HONNEUR

NATIONAL REPORTS

TO THE IXTH

INTERNATIONAL

CONGRESS

OF COMPARATIvE

LAW

269-89, especially at 283-89 (1974) (Milan, Giuffr6) (Italian report).
27. See, e.g., Foulon-Piganiol, La lutte contre le racisme, in 1972 RFCULIL DALLOZ
SnRY, CHRONIQUE 261, 263. See also Foulon-Piganiol, Riflexions sur la diffamation
raciale, in 1970 RECUEML DALLOZ STREY, CHRONIQUE 133; Foulon-Piganiol, Nouvelles
riflexions sur la diffamation raciale, in 1970 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, CHRONIQUE 163.
28. See, e.g., Calais-Auloy, Les ventes aggressives, in 1970 REcUEIL DALLOZ
SIREY, CHRONIQUE 37, 39. See also M.-L. RASSAT, La MINISTkRE PUBLIC ENTRE SON
(Paris, Pichon et Durand Auzias), stating that:
PASSE ET SON AVENiR 220-21 (1967)
It is well known . . . that the ministgre public often refrains from prosecuting
those violations that only slightly upset ordre public when the evidence concerning the elements of the violation is awkward. This happens for almost all
violations of commercial legislation and, particularly, of corporate legislation,
since in order to prove such violations, much expert evidence on accounting is
needed, which is complicated and expensive.
29. See, e.g., Bihl, supra note 15, at 527, 529; cf. Despax, La defense juridique
de Penvironnement, 1970 LA SEMAINE JURMIQUE, JURIS-CLASSEUR PLRIODIQUE, DocTRINE

No. 2359.

30.
31.

Calais-Auloy, supra note 28, at 39.
See Comparative Study at 801-04.
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ney.3 2 Second, in many civil law countries the ministre public is a

member of a career judiciary. 33 In other words, he is essentially a
judge who, for certain periods of his judicial career, acts in the role
of a governmental attorney. His status, education, and psychology,
however, remain essentially those of a judge, "au dessus de la m~lde."1' 4
Partisan advocacy is something to which he is a total stranger. In the
words of a leading French magistrate (the Attorney General of Lyon),
the minist~re public "would hardly be suitable for acting as the champion of a class, a group of citizens, or their interests." 35 Third, there is
the important fact that, like judges and advocates, the civil law governmental attorneys general are specialists in only one field, the law; this
is no less true for American (and, generally, for the common law)
attorneys general. As legal specialists, the attorneys general and the
ministres publics may be sufficiently equipped to perform the relatively simple tasks of "traditional justice," such as prosecution of traditional crimes (essentially individual in nature and typified by the triad
of theft, robbery, and murder) and representation in civil litigation
of such traditional public interests as the maintenance of the family
structure and the legal capacity of individuals. However, the minist~res
publics (and, likewise, their common law analogues) are very poorly
equipped, both as criminal prosecutors and as representatives in civil
litigation, to handle new, more complex, and highly sophisticated
situations, essentially collective in nature: economic crimes and other
illegal activities by banks and corporations which are detrimental to
large numbers of small savers or shareholders; abusive monopolies;
industrial pollution; unlawful land development; fraudulent advertising; food and drug violations. To act as defenders of such new collective

32. While their Continental-European counterparts are generally "magistrates,"
that is, members of the judiciary, which connotes a degree of independence, attorneys
general and district attorneys are merely part of the executive branch of government.
See Comparative Study at 828-31.
33. In France, for example, the members of the office of the Ministre public,
like the other members of the judiciary, are law graduates who entered the judiciary
at a young age and will remain as "magistrates" virtually for life.
34. See, e.g., Krings, Le r6le du ministgre public dans le proc~s civil, in RAPPORTS BELGES AU IXE CONoP£S INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE 139, 166 (1974)
(Brussels, Centre Interuniversitaire de Droit Compare) (Belgian report).
35. 3. Jegu, Le rble du minist re public dans le procs civil 7 (unpublished

French report prepared for Section II.C.l. of the Ninth International Congress of Comparative Law, held in Tehran from September 27 through October 4, 1974, on the
general topic of "The Role of the Minist~re public in Civil Proceedings") (on file both
at the Institute of Comparative Law of the University of Florence and at the International Academy of Comparative Law). See also Krings, supra note 34, at 147, 165-66.
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interests, the governmental attorneys general would have to be much
more than what they now are-lawyers. They, or their staffs, would
have to command, from time to time, expertise in economics and
accounting, in banking and marketing, in urban planning, chemistry,
ecology, and various other fields.
Belgian, French, and Italian experience in this area is enlightening. Since 1881 in Belgium, since 1913 in France, and since 1942 in
Italy, the ministate public has been entrusted with a general right to
sue or intervene in civil cases involving "ordre public" or "public interest." 86 These terms are quite vague and flexible,3 7 and ample discretion is allowed the ministare public in the ascertainment of what
constitutes the "ordre public" or "public interest" in a specific case.
Nevertheless, it is a recognized fact that the ministate public has used
his broad powers much too rarely to protect effectively newly-emerged
meta-individual interests, such as fundamental freedoms of ethnic,
political, or religious minorities, the conservation of natural resources,
and the rights of consumers. 3 Apparently, the American experience,
and that of other common law countries, is not very different. Although
the idea that the attorney general has standing to commence or to intervene in civil cases as the general representative of a vaguely defined
"public interest" 39 is deeply rooted in the common law tradition, the
American attorney general seems to be about as ineffective as his European counterpart.40 Recent comparative research has led me to similar
36. For more detailed information, see Comparative Study at 812-16.
37. See id. at 797 n.4.
38. See id. at 813-15 & nn.87-91 (France and Belgium), 815-16 & nn.92-95

(Italy).

39. See id. at 828 & n.153, 848-49 & nn.249-53. See generally NATIONAL
TION OF

ATTORNEYS

GENERAL,

AssOcIA-

COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL,

REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL].

32-61 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as

40. See Comparative Study at 830-31 & nn.162-67, 848-52.
There are nevertheless increasing signs that American attorneys general, particularly
at the state level, are becoming more active in asserting the public interest in such
areas as consumer and environmental protection. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY
GENERALS' INTERVENTION BEFORE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1975); Immell, Pollution

Control in Illinois-The Role of the Attorney General, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 961-73
(1974); Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the North
Chrolina Attorney General in the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST
INTRA. L. REV. 1 (1969); O'Brien, The Role of the Attorney General as a Public
Lawyer, 44 L.A.B. BULL. 495-98, 531-33 (1969); Comment, The Attorney General as
Consumer Advocate: City of York v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 1170 (1973); Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1030 (1974).
The attorney general is still a political officer, however, and not all attorneys
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conclusions for a number of other nations, including Mexico, 41 Japan 4 2
and others. 43 Even in the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the potentially
unlimited growth of the Prokuratura's powers in civil litigation, it
seems that little use is made by the governmental attorney general of
44
such powers when non-traditional collective interests are at stake.
IV.

NEWER SOLUTIONS

A. The "Specialized Governmental Attorney General": Comparative
Illustrations
Faced by the manifest inadequacy of the two basic traditional
solutions-the "individual standing" and the "governmental standing"
solutions-modern legal systems, within and without the civil law
world, have tried to fashion newer and more effective devices.
One such attempt is represented by the opening and gradual enlargement, in a growing number of countries, of a first important breach
in the closed citadel of the governmental attorney general's exclusive
power to represent public interests in litigation. This breach can be
described as the "specialized governmental attorney general" solution,
since it consists of a proliferation of govermental agencies, highly
specialized in certain areas of modem life and welfare government,
general will want, or will be able, to adopt the role of "people's lawyers" actively
pursuing the protection, often against the government itself, of nontraditional public
interests. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 416-17, 434-37
(dealing with the lack of adequate staffing). Further, without positive legislation, attorneys general lack the power to vindicate the public interest by winning damages for
individuals. See Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and
Environmental Protection, supra, at 1035-36 & nn.29-35. Finally, the activist state attorney general faces possible conflicts of interest, in that the "public" interest he sets
out to vindicate may conflict with the interest of the governmental agency he must
represent. Id. at 1034-35. See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
COMMITTEE OF THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERALS' INTERVENTION BEFORE REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra, at 25-28. In sum, it is clear that reforms in this area, while welcome, cannot be the complete answer to the problem of
public interest representation. Cf. REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
380-82, 408-09. See also Section IV B infra.
41. See S. Ofiate, El Papel del Ministerio Pdblico Dentro del Proceso Civil
Mexicano (unpublished Mexican report; see note 35 supra).
42. See T. Kojima, The Representation of Collective and Public Interests in
[Japanese] Civil Litigation 2, July 1974 (unpublished paper on file at the University
of Florence Institute of Comparative Law); C. Suzuki, The Role of the "Minister
Public" in Civil Proceedings in Japan 13-15 (unpublished Japanese report; see note 35

supra).
43. See generally Comparative Study passim.
44. See id. at 821-25 & nn.124-41.
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entrusted, inter alia, with the power to commence or intervene in civil
litigation within those areas.
Some illustrations of this phenomenon seem appropriate; we may
choose them, almost at random, from among the very many examples
offered by comparative analysis.
(1) In Sweden, a Consumer Ombudsman was created in 1970.
His office is composed of 25 members: the ombudsman, his deputy, and
a team of specialists including lawyers, economists, and marketing experts. One of the Consumer Ombudsman's tasks is to bring lawsuits
before the newly established "Market Court" in cases of improper
marketing and advertising practices detrimental to consumers.4"
(2) In England, a Director-General of Fair Trading was created
in 1973. One of his tasks is to initiate proceedings before the "Restrictive Practices Court" against monopolistic practices that are "contrary to the public interest," with a view, inter alia, toward protecting
consumers.

46

(3) Again in England, since 1968 the Race Relations Board has
been entrusted with the task, among others, of bringing civil proceedings against various kinds of racial discrimination that are "unlawful"
but not criminal.4 7
(4) In India, based on the Indian Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices Act of 1969, the Registrar for Restrictive Trade Agreements
has the power to act as an "advocate of public interest" by investigating and initiating proceedings against restrictive trade agreements and
practices.48
(5) Finally, in Ghana, an Environmental Protection Council was
created in 1974; apparently it is endowed, inter alia, with the power
to conduct civil litigation for environmental protection. 49
45. See id. at 846-47 & nn.238-45; D. KMNG, CONSUMER PROTECTION EXPERI3-18 (1974) (South Hackensack, N. J., Fred Rothman & Co.). For

MENTS IN SWEDEN

the now vast literature, see, for example, Bernitz, La protection des consommateurs en
Suede et dans les pays nordiques, 26 RFvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COmmPRE 543,
556-59, 573-76 (1974); Stenberg, L'ombudsrnan suedois pour les consommateurs, 26
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ComPARP

577 (1974).

46. See I. Jacob, The Representation of the Public Interest in English Civil Proceedings 17-18, 33-38 (unpublished English report; see note 35 supra).
47. See id. at 17-18, 39-42; ComparativeStudy at 841 n.213.
48. See L. Singhvi, Representation of Public Interest in the Indian Legal System
8-10 (unpublished Indian report; see note 35 supra); Comparative Study at 841-42
n.218.
49. See N. Ollennu, Representation of Public, Collective, and Group Interests
in Civil Litigation 5-6 (unpublished Ghanaian report; see note 35 supra) ; Comparative
Study at 841-42 & n.219.
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It should be emphasized that these are but a few examples of a
burgeoning phenomenon which is rapidly spreading over much of the
world, a phenomenon which, while familiar to American lawyers for
many years, and especially since the New Deal era, is essentially new
to other nations. As for the United States, in addition to the numerous
administrative agencies that have been operating for several decadessuch as the Food and Drug Administration, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission-Congress has recently
created an Environmental Protection Agency and a Legal Services
Corporation and is trying to create a Consumer Protection Agency.
Apparently, the principal task of this latter agency would be to act,
even in court, as an advocate, or ombudsman, for the consumer. 50
B. Inadequacies of the "Specialized Governmental Attorney General"
Solution
The "specialized attorney general" solution has represented, no
doubt, notable progress on the difficult road toward assuring that the
emerging diffuse interests enjoy effective access to justice, a progress
in which the United States has been in the vanguard for more than
40 years. Notable progress also has been represented by another, very
similar attempt, in which the United States is once more in the forefront: the departmentalization of the office of the governmental attorney general, whereby some departments are specialized in such matters
as welfare, antitrust, civil rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection.5 1
Yet, even this solution has proven to be largely inadequate. Even
specialized agencies (or departments) tend to assume a bureaucratic
psychology and a hierarchical structure that often render their action
too slow, rigid, and centralized. They, too, often lack the aggressiveness,
imagination, and flexibility that are so necessary for an effective attack,
both preventive and corrective, against the new, sophisticated types of
50.

See C. Halpern, Some Observations on Developments in the United States

Regarding Representation of Public Interests in Civil Litigation 15-18 (June 1974)
(unpublished paper on file at the University of Florence Institute of Comparative Law);
Leighton, The Consumer Advocacy Agency Proposal . . . Again, 27 AD. L. Rnv. 149,
153-61 (1975). On further innovative American experiments with agencies for public
advocacy, see note 56 infra.
51. See generally L. HuSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUsTICE 54-109 (1967)
(New York, Praeger). On the same phenomenon at the state level, see, for example,
REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 390-91; Note, supra note 40, at

1053-54.
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abuses which are frequently originated by centers of political or economic power and are so difficult to discover and control. It should also
be added that the creation of specialized governmental agencies usually
requires legislative action which, in turn, is very slow and difficult to
achieve and, once achieved, even slower and more difficult to readapt
to new experiences and new circumstances. The risk is thus to have
structures that are created too late, and, once created, are adapted too
late to meet rapidly changing needs-burdensome, costly, useless entities
which, like parasites, impoverish and paralyze the economic and social
life of a country. Sadly, post-World War II Italy has an unfortunately
rich experience in this area. But even in a country like the United
States, where the experience with the specialized governmental attorney
general has been, on the whole, quite positive for several decades, not
a few illusions have had to be abandoned. The tendency today is to
recognize that regulatory agencies have frequently been "captured,"
both psychologically and politically, by the very interest groups that
2
they were supposed to control.
Thus, as recently documented in a thorough study by. Professor
Hein K tz of Germany, 53 increasingly, many Western experts-from
52. A leading American expert in public interest problems noted that in the
United States.
there has been considerable disillusionment with governmental agencies with a
broad mandate to regulate corporate behavior ... in the public interest. These
agencies, many of which were begun in the New Deal years, are now perceived
as being "captured" and being too responsive to the industries which they
are intended to regulate, and too unresponsive to the interests of the
general public.
C. Halpern, supra note 50, at 6. See also id. at 17; Scott, Two Models of the Civil

Process, in

STANFORD LEGAL ESSAYS

413, 415 (J.H. Merryman ed. 1975)

(Stanford,

Cal., Stanford Univ. Press); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 304-05 (on the "incapacity"
of administrative agencies "to carry the entire burden"). For the criticism at its strongest, see Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the
Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1973).
In a recent, thorough study of administrative law, Richard B. Stewart gives four
reasons for the industry orientation of American regulatory agencies: (I) the conservatism inherent in the "division of responsibility" between the regulated firms and
the administrator-this division of responsibility limits the administrator to negative
action which, if pursued too far, may lead to economic dislocation for which he will
be held accountable; (2) the tendency of the bureaucracy to become "regulation
minded"-ths tendency leads to a proliferation of rules which inevitably restricts the
entry of new competitors, buttressing the position of established firms; (3) the relative
lack of resources---"in terms of money, personnel, and political influence"-of the
agency as compared to the industry, which forces the agency to rely on compromise;
and (4) the connected need of the agency to depend on outside sources of information, which tend to be organized interests with a stake in the outcome and which are
predominantly the regulated firms themselves. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HAty. L. Rv. 1667, 1685-86 (1975).
53. See K~tz, supra note 5, at 81-82 & nn.26, 59, 90, 96.
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Germany to the United States-have adopted the view that not even
specialized administrative agencies can become the effective defenders
of the new economic, social, and environmental interests of collectivities
and groups. Recent research of ours has reached similar conclusions
for other countries as well, including the Soviet Union and Japan.5 4
Political science adds its own explanation for this world-wide phenomenon by observing that modern collective interests, such as those in a
healthy environment, in consumer protection, and in traffic safety, are
too "diffuse" 55 to be sufficiently "felt" and "taken seriously" by the
public administration in its day-to-day action. 6 Economic analysis sup54. See Comparative Study at 824-25 & n.139 (Soviet Union), 843 & n.223
(Japan).
55. The German writers speak of "breitgestreute Allgemeininteressen." See note
56 infra.
56.
[I]n a system of pluralistic democracy, it is difficult to organize and make
politically effective such diffuse societal interests (das breitgestreute Allgemeininteresse) as the public's health, the protection of the environment, traffic
safety, and the protection of consumers. This is the reason why such interests
are not taken seriously enough by the public administration in its everyday
action.
K6tz, supra note 5, at 96-97 (with bibliographical references). See generally M. OLSON,
TnE LooIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press).
A positive development in the United States aimed specifically at this problem is
the device of setting up agencies that have the specific objective of helping diffuse, unorganized, and relatively weak groups to gain influence in regulatory agencies feared
to be "captured." The perfect example is the proposed Consumer Protection Agency
(see note 50 supra and accompanying text), of which Ralph Nader has stated: "I would
consider it a $15 million contribution to public interest law." Green, The Perils of
Public Interest Law, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1975, at 21. Of course, it is too
early to judge whether this optimism is justified, or whether such agencies will themselves succumb to some of the same problems which undermine the effectiveness of
other governmental agencies.
The same trend toward the creation of specialized governmental agencies for the
unorganized can be seen in the concept of "Public Counsel," put into practice by the
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 45 U.S.C. § 715(d)(2) (Supp. 1975). The Public
Counsel, according to Bloch and Stein, "seeks to assure more constructive participation
by providing factual data and well-reasoned, well-organized testimony from a broad
cross section of interested parties, thus increasing the probability that a full and
credible record will be developed for the agency from these divergent, often unorganized,
and frequently uninformed sources." Bloch & Stein, The Public Counsel Concept in
Practice: The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rv.

215, 235 (1974).
Also of increasing importance as a model for state legislation is the New Jersey
Department of the Public Advocate, established in 1974, which, inter alia, is mandated
to "represent the public interest in any such administrative and court proceedings, other
than those under the jurisdiction of the Division of Rate Counsel . . .as the Public
Advocate deems shall best serve the public interest." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-29
(Supp. 1975). The law establishes within the Department of Public Advocate an "Office
of Inmate Advocacy," a "Division of Rate Counsel," a "Division of Mental Health Advocacy," a "Division of Citizen Complaints and Dispute Settlement," and the "Division of
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ports the same conclusion.57 Perhaps too skeptically, but quite realistically, Pietro Verri-Beccaria's great inspirer-would presumably repeat
today his observation of two centuries ago, that "ordinarily, the last to
see clearly society's real interests are precisely those who are paid to
do so."'
C. The "PrivateAttorney General" Solution and the Value of "Combined" or "Multiple" Solutions: ComparativeExamples
Faced by the proven inadequacy of the traditional solutions, contemporary legal systems have been turning to more complex, sophisticated, and flexible solutions which have proven much more effective in
dealing with the problem of protecting the emerging diffuse rights.
Essentially, these modern solutions consist of (a) utilizing the initiative
and zeal of private persons and organizations by allowing them to act in
court for a general or group interest, even though they may not be
directly injured in their own individual rights, and (b) combining
and integrating this private zeal with the initiative of, and/or control
by, governmental bodies, whether or not specialized. In the first case,
borrowing from Judge Jerome Frank's well-known terminology, 9 we
may speak of a "private attorney general" solution; in the second, we
may speak of "combined" or "multiple" solutions.
Examples of these newer kinds of solutions are numerous. In the
United States one would immediately think, of course, of class and other
representative and public interest actions,60 an extremely important
phenomenon, especially in the last ten years or so, which once again
has brought the United States to the forefront of modern legal developments. 61 Indeed, the very philosophy of class and public interest actions,
which has been so severely challenged by recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court 2 and some lower American courts, represents
Public Interest Advocacy" whose jurisdiction is described in the statutory provision
quoted above. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-1 to-27 (Supp. 1975).
The remarkable feature of these innovative American experiments is that the
public advocate tends not merely to substitute for, but also to stimulate and organize,
the participation of individuals and groups to influence governmental decisions in which
they may be concerned. In a sense, these experiments are examples of those "combined" solutions discussed below. See Section IV C infra.
57. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, ch. 27, at 386-92.
58. Verri, Pens'es ditachies, first published from the author's manuscript in
MILANO IN EUROPA 138 (M. Schettini ed. 1963) (Milan, Gino del Duca).
59. See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Gir. 1943).
60. For a most comprehensive discussion, see Private Suits at 343-410.
61. See notes 103-126 infra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 63-65 infra. See also note 23 supra.
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the core of a tremendously important, world-wide contemporary evolution, an evolution in which the American institutions often have been
considered the models to follow. Paradoxically, after the rigid and, in
my opinion, quite formalistic limitations imposed by Zahn v. Inter6 and Alyeska Pipenational Paper Co.,63 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
65
line Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, developments outside
America may now appear, in part, more promising in this very area
in which the United States was looked to, and admired, as the courageous forerunner. The inadequacies of the traditional standing solutions-individual and governmental-described in the previous sections of this article become even more significant when placed in this
context, for it is on those demonstrably inadequate methods of protecting meta-individual rights that American citizens may be left to rely
if the limitations of Eisen and other recent decisions signal a lasting
retreat from the advanced position United States jurisprudence had
achieved.
The two newer kinds of solutions just mentioned deserve some
further illustration. The first is the private attorney general solution
-the flexible utilization of the initiative of'private persons or organizations for the protection of diffuse rights. From among the numerous
examples of this development, I wish to discuss only a few; they all
reflect innovations after World War II and represent a mere sample of
a universal evolution of major importance:
(1) In Bavaria, every person, physical and legal, even though not
directly interested, has standing to bring proceedings before the Bavarian Constitutional Court to attack Land legislation violative of civil
rights (whether individual or social) proclaimed by the 1946 Land
Constitution. 6 The idea at the basis of this Popularklage or citizen
63.

414 U.S. 291 (1973).

64. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The case is analyzed, e.g., in Bennett, Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin: Supreme Court Calls for Revamping of Class Action Strategy, 1974
Wis. L. Rav. 801. For a generally convincing criticism of the United States Supreme
Court's decision, see Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. Rav.
97. For a thorough analysis of the Eisen case prior to the Supreme Court decision (and,
in fact, ante litteram criticism of the Supreme Court's decision), see Note, Managing
the Large Class Action: Elsen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REv. 426 (1973).
65: 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See Comment, The Discretionary Award of Attorney's
Fees by the Federal Courts: Selective Deviation from the No-Fee Rule and the Regrettably Brief Life of the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 588

(1975).
66.
69-72

See M.
(1955,

CAPPELLETTI, LA

3d printing 1974)

& H. ZACHER,
1970) (Munich, Beck).
SCHWEIGER

GIURISDIZIONE

COSTITUZIONALE DELLE LIEERT,

(Milan, Giuffr6); C. LEuSSER, E.

DIE VERFASSUNG

DES FREISTAATES

BAYERN

GERNER,

K.

42 (2d ed.
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action is that when one person's fundamental rights are violated, everyone's freedom is indirectly violated. If the court holds the challenged
statute unconstitutional, its decision has erga omnes and retroactive
effect.

67

(2) In Italy, a law of 1967 grants "everyone" standing to sue
against the unlawful issuance of construction permits by local authorities.68 Here, too, the decision, if favorable to the plaintiff, has ultra
partes effects.
(3) In the Federal Republic of Germany, a statute of 1909,
amended in 1965, allows consumer associations (in addition to merchants and their associations) to challenge in court acts of unfair competition. There is no need to prove direct and personal injury.69
(4) In various countries, including India,70 Italy,71 and Tanzania 7 2
actiones populares or citizen actions are allowed to attack unlawful
electoral activities.
This list of examples could easily be extended. Suffice it to add
that similar developments, although still in a very embryonic and tentative phase, can be seen even at the level of international organizations. 78
As for the other variant of the newer solutions-the combined or
multiple solutions-the following illustrations are especially interesting.
A first, most instructive example is offered by Swedish consumer
protection law. We have already mentioned 74 that the Consumer Ombudsman, a "specialized governmental attorney general," has the power
67. M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 66, at 71 & n.234.
68. Law of Aug. 6, 1967, No. 765, art. 10, [1967] Gaz. Uff. 4846, 4848-49. Unfortunately, the Consiglio di Stato (Italy's Supreme Administrative Court) has interpreted the 1967 statute in a restrictive sense, clearly a contra legem interpretation
condemned by most commentators and justified merely by the tenacity of traditional
concepts. Decision of June 9, 1970, No. 523, [1970] Foro Ital. III 201, Giur. Ital. III
193 (Consiglio di Stato) (the latter contains a critical note by E. Guicciardi).
Even after this restrictive interpretation, however, standing is recognized for "everyone"
who "lives in the area" surrounding the unlawful construction.
69. Comparative Study at 877-78 & nn.374, 379; Kbtz, supra note 5, at 93-94.
70. Comparative Study at 877-78 & n.376, with references. Whether this still
holds after the latest political developments in India-which led the Indian Parliament
to enact legislation in 1975 barring the Supreme Court of India from deciding a case
concerning Indira Gandhi's election-is a matter that must be left open here.
71. Id. at 877 & n.375. See also F. CARPI, L'-FFICACIA "ULTRA PARTES" DELLA
SENTENZA CIVILB 99-119 (1974) (Milan, Giuffr).
72. See G. Onyiuke, The Role of the Ministere Public in Civil Proceedings in the
United Republic of Tanzania 4-5 (unpublished Tanzanian report; see note 35 supra),
discussed in ComparativeStudy at 878 & n.377.
73. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIvE ASSEMBLY, PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 27, 66-67, 83 (1972)
(Strasbourg). See also Comparative
Study at 878 & n.378.
74. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.

VINDICATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1976]

to bring proceedings before the Market Court. However, this power
does not belong exclusively to him. Private consumer associations also
have standing to commence cases before the Court, 75 thus possibly substituting for, and in any case stimulating, the initiative of the special
administrative agency. In fact, even the Swedish ministare public may
have a role in the proceeding,7 6 with the consequence that the competence, initiative, and control of both private organizations and (special
and general) governmental attorneys general are most ingeniously
intermingled and combined.
Modern Swedish legislation offers still another typical example.
Standing to bring proceedings in the courts to obtain an injunction
against activities harmful to the natural environment is granted not
only to a special administrative body (another kind of "special governmental attorney general"), but also to private individuals, even those
7
only "indirectly" aggrieved.
A third noteworthy example is provided by France. Due to the
already mentioned, well-recognized incapacity of the ministare public
to provide adequate protection of consumers' rights, 78 a remarkable

statute enacted on December 27, 1973, commonly known as loi Royer,
has opened the doors of the courts of justice to associations of consumers,
granting them standing to sue in case of "facts directly or indirectly
detrimental to the collective interest of the consumers."7 9 At the same
75.

Section 6 of the law of 1970 (the Marketing Practices Act) and section 3 of

the law of 1971 (the Act Prohibiting Improper Terms of Contract). For an English
translation of these laws and an informative discussion of consumer protection in
Sweden, see D. KING, supra note 45. Section 7 of the law of 1971 allows an even
more complex combination of efforts, since it entrusts with the Public Prosecutor the
task of "instituting proceedings before the ordinary courts in regard to the imposition
of fines." Thus the following combinations are possible in order to enforce the rights
of consumers: Both (1) the consumer ombudsman and (2) a private association can
bring complaints before the Market Court; (3) the Market Court can issue injunctions
prohibiting, under penalty of fine, further use of certain contract terms; in case of
noncompliance, (4) the ministgre public brings suit for the imposition of the fine, but
he does so only upon notification by (5) the consumer ombudsman or (6) any other
person who had applied to the Market Court for the injunction. See Comparative Study

at 846-47.
76. See note 75 supra.
77. Swedish Law of 1969 for the Preservation of the Environment. See Comparative Study at 840 n.210, 877 & n.372.
78. See Section III B supra, and in particular, note 38 and accompanying text.
79. Statute No. 73-1193 of December 27, 1973, art. 46, [1973] J.O. 14139, [1974]
D.S.L. 30, 35, [1974] B.L.D. 30 ("loi Royer"):
Mhe associations duly certified, whose purpose, as expressly declared in their
charters, is the protection of consumers' interests, may, so long as they are
authorized for this purpose, bring civil actions in all courts concerning facts
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time, however, the loi has also provided for a series of controls which
are intended to assure that consumers are adequately represented by the
associations bringing suit and, generally, to prevent abuses by these
associations; such controls are entrusted, in part, to the ministre
public himself.8 0 The loi Royer thus represents yet another illustration
of the myriad ways to combine, and mutually integrate, the "partisan
zeal of private interested groups" with the equilibrium, the detachment, and the "neutrality" of a governmental official who is midway
between a judge and a public administrator. It should be mentioned
that another French statute recently has adopted a somewhat similar
solution with a view to protect minority groups against certain racial
offenses;"' this solution will most probably also be adopted in that
82
country to deal with violations of urban planning regulations.
A further significant illustration is provided by recent legislation
in the United States. As is well known, the Clean Air Act of 1970 allows
not only the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(a "specialized attorney general" in our terminology), but also any
private citizen, even though not directly injured, to bring suit-typically a "citizen action"-against polluters.8 3
V.

OLD INSTITUTIONS ADAPTED TO NEW NEEDS AND GOALS

The "private attorney general" solution, and a variety of "combined" or "multiple" solutions, have evolved in a number of countries
directly or indirectly detrimental to the collective interest of the consumers.
A decree [by the executive) will establish the conditions under which the
consumers' associations may be so authorized; before such authorization is
granted, an opinion of the minist re public must be considered, as well as the
association's representativeness at the national and local level. The authorization can only be granted to associations which do not themselves exercise
professional activities in any form ....
Id.
80. Art. 46, § 2 of the "loi Royer" requires the opinion of the minish~re public.
See note 79 supra.
81. Statute No. 72-546 of July 1, 1972 ("concerning the fight against racism").
Article 5-11 of this statute grants standing to act as partie civile (see section V A infra)
to "every association that has been duly certified at least five years before the time
of the facts, whose purpose, as set out in its charter, is to fight against racism."
82. See, e.g., Thevenon, La reforme foncigre i FElysie, Le Figaro, March 17,
1975, at 1. This commentator observes that the reason for the envisaged reform granting
standing to a number of associations is the laxity of the ministgre public and of the
public administration generally in uncovering and prosecuting violations of that code.
83. See, e.g., Comparative Study at 843 n.226, 877 n.371; Private Suits at 394.
In the case of an action initiated by a private citizen, the Administrator always has the
right to intervene in the action. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(c) (2) (1970).
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by way of gradual adaptations of older institutions, rather than, or in
addition to, ad hoc legislative innovations, illustrations of which were
discussed in the preceding section. Thus, some old institutions have
assumed new content and achieved new vitality, as may be indicated by
the following three examples drawn from France, England and Australia, and the United States, respectively.
A. The French "Constitution de Partie Civile"
It should again be recalled that, while the French governmental
attorney general-the ministhrepublic-is an efficient prosecutor of the
traditional crimes, he is, on the contrary, quite inefficient in the prosecution of such newer crimes, essentially collective in nature, as abuses
in the sale of securities, false advertising, food and drug frauds, pollution, and illegal construction.8 4 Fortunately, the French govermental
attorney general, unlike his analogues in other civil law countries, such
as Italy, 85 does not have a monopoly on the power to commence criminal
prosecutions. Within certain limits, it is possible in France for individuals and private groups claiming to be aggrieved by a crime to put in
motion a criminal proceeding without the initiative, and even against
the will, of the ministre public. They can do so by bringing a civil
action ("constitution de partie civile") for the recovery of their damages, sometimes merely symbolic, caused by the crime. The civil and
criminal actions will then be joined in one single proceeding.8 6 It is
generally recognized that this important exception to the ministre
public's exclusive power to prosecute crimes has led to results which
are very positive, especially in view of the more effective protection thus
obtained against the newer "collective" crimes mentioned above. 87

84. See Section III B supra. See also note 82 supra.
85. But see Amodio, L'azione penale delle associazioni dei consumatori per la
repressione delle frodi alimentari, in 1974 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA
PENALE 515, 518;36 (an isolated, though quite elaborate, bpinion not accepted by the

courts).
86.

C. PRO. PPN. art. 88; M.-L. RASSAT, supra note 28, at 204, 233, 239. Various
rules are intended to prevent abuse. See, e.g., C. PRO. PIEN. arts. 88, 91. In Spain the
situation is still more radical: a penal action may be initiated by any citizen, not only
by the victim of the crime. See Comparative Study at 837-39 n.204.
87. See the references in Section III B supra. See also Audinet, La protection
judiciaire des fins poursuivies par les associations, 53 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
cimv
211, 229 (1955) ; Comparative Study at 837-39 n.204. On the possibility of certain
groups taking special advantage of the procedure outlined in the text for the protection of diffuse interests, see notes 79, 81-82 supra.
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B. The Relator Action in England and Certain Other Common Law
Countries
As we saw above, the common law governmental attorney general
has, in theory, very extensive powers to commence, or to intervene in,
civil cases in his capacity as parens patriae-that is, as the representative of a broadly defined "public interest.""" Such powers include the
general duty "to promote the interest of all sections of the community
and to prevent the wrongdoing of one, resulting in the injury of the
general welfare."89 Recent research based on national reports from
several common law countries, 90 however, has demonstrated that the
attorney general's broad powers are, in fact, rarely used,"' due to a number of reasons including, but by no means limited to, shortage of manpower.9 2 As a consequence, the actual role of the common law governmental attorneys general (as well as district and state attorneys) in
civil litigation is, perhaps, even more modest than that of their analogues in most civil law nations. 93 This very fact may explain the reason why another traditional institution, the "relator action," has become quite vital in England 94 and Australia 95 and in some other common law countries in which class actions are little used. 98
88.
89.
published
90.
91.
92.

93.

See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
G. Taylor, The Role of the Minist~re Public in Civil Proceedings 10 (unAustralian report; see note 35 supra).
Comparative Study at 794-96 n.l.
See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
For other reasons, see Section III B supra.

In post-World War II Germany, however, the role of the Staatsanwalt in civil

litigation has been so drastically curtailed that it may now be even more modest than
in most common law countries. See Comparative Study at 812-13 n.86.
94.
In English law questions of title to sue in actions of public concern
are obviated when proceedings are brought in the name of the AttorneyGeneral on the relation of a member of the public . . . . This procedure has
been much used to review the legality of local authority activities; to secure
relief in cases of infringement of a public right, e.g. public nuisances; and
to secure the proper administration of public and charitable trusts.
ScoTTxsH LA-W COMMISSION, MEMORANDUm No. 14: REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 48 (n.d.) (recently published).
In Scotland, on the contrary, the institution of the relator action is not used.
See id.; J. Thomson, The Power of the Lord Advocate to Intervene in Civil Litigation
in Scotland 4 & n.17 (unpublished Scottish report; see note 35 supra).
95. See Comparative Study at 849 & n.254.
96. Cf. id. at 851-52 & nn.276-77.
On the much less frequent use of class litigation in Great Britain and Australia as
compared to that in the United States, see, e.g., Alston, Representative Class Actions
in Environmental Litigation, 9 MELBOURNE U.L. REv. 307, 310, 317 (1973). Alston
complains about the infrequent use of the class device and believes that class litigation
may represent a very important potential in British and Australian law.
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The relator action consists of a suit brought in the public interest
by a private individual or group97 that otherwise would have no
standing, but which sues in lieu, and with the consent or "fiat," of the
attorney general. The latter retains a controlling power (in fact, sparingly exercised) over the, entire progress of the action. 98 The relief
sought must be such as to "benefit ...

the public or at least a section

public,"9 9

of the
and not only the relator actor. The most frequent examples of relator actions are suits to stop a public nuisance, to restrain
conduct injurious to the public welfare, to restrain developers of land, 00
and to obtain "prohibitions and restrictions directed towards public
health and comfort and the orderly arrangement of municipal areas."''1 1
Thus, by means of the relator action, private persons (or groups)
may fill the gap left by the inertia of the governmental attorney general;
but they do so after the authorization, and under the continuous control (even though more potential than real), of the attorney general
himself, who can thereby prevent frivolous suits and other abuses. 0

2

C. The Class Action in the United States: A Civilian's Appraisal
The third illustration'" is provided by the tremendous, although
recently impaired, development in the United States, especially since
1938,104 but even more so since 1966,105 of yet another traditional in-

stitution, the "class" (or "representative") action.
97. As for relator actions brought by groups, see the examples in G. Taylor
supra note 89, at 8.
98. Id. See S. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEw OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 401
(3d ed. 1973) (London, Stevens & Sons); cf. I. Jacob, supra note 46, at 50-52.
99. G. Taylor, supra note 89, at 12. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 98, at 404.
100.

See Comparative Study at 850 & nn.259-64.

101. G. Taylor, supra note 89, at 8, 12. See also S. DE SMITH, supra note 98,
at 404-05.
102. For a more detailed description of relator actions, see Comparative Study at
848-52 and the references therein.
103. Still another example of great interest, although not discussed in this article,
is the participation of amicus curiae in civil litigation. The historical origins and development of this institution are discussed in some detail in Krislov, The Amicus Curiae

Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963). For recent developments and comparative perspectives, see C. Halpern, supra note 50, at 14; Comparative
Study at 876 n.368; T. Kojima, supra note 42, at 2-3.

104. See, e.g., F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 495 (1965) (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co.); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1752,
at 511 (1972).
105. In 1966, FED. R. Civ. P. 23 was completely rewritten with the aim of making
it more pragmatic and functional. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 104, at

§ 1753; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 380-94 (1967).
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This section is not intended as an analysis of this unique feature
of the United States legal system; I wish only to make a few observations, essentially an outsider's observations, to convey a civilian's appraisal of this American institution.
First, it seems clear that there have been very persuasive reasons
for the extraordinary growth in America of this old and, from a practical point of view, once rather unimportant device rooted in equity.100
These reasons can be easily identified with the compelling need, typical
of all modern societies but particularly strong in the United States, to
provide a flexible, efficient protection of group and collective interests
against the abuses of a mass economy and a mass government (or, indeed, a welfare government).10 Thus, developments in the area of the
modern class action-but also of the shareholders' derivative action and,
more generally, of the "public interest action"' 08-may be explained
as manifestations of the very same philosophy, or raison d'e'tre, that gave
powerful impetus to parallel developments in so many other countries,
as surveyed above.10 9 Indeed, the unprecedented growth of class actions
represents the most typical "American answer" to the exigency of giving
adequate protection to those emerging diffuse rights-the "newer
property"-which have become so fundamental in the contemporary
world.
Second, class actions represent yet another instance of those "combined" or "multiple" solutions which, as discussed above, have the potential of being the most effective method of vindicating the emerging
meta-individual rights. The class suitor is typically a "private attorney
general," in that his initiative is not limited to the defense of "his own"
rights. At the same time, even though the class suitor is different from
the relator suitor in England or Australia, in that he does not need the
"fiat" and is not subject to the control of the governmental attorney
general, he nevertheless is subject to limits and controls enforced by
the court and determined both by the legislature and by a large amount
106. See F. JAms, supra note 104, at 494-95; Homburger, State Class Actions
and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 609-12, 626-29 (1971). The original
purpose of the class action in equity was simply to provide "a procedural device so
that mere numbers would not disable large groups of individuals, united in interest,
from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable
wrongs." 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 104, § 1751, at 503, quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
107. See Hazard, supra note 9, at 308-10.
108. The distinctions, but also frequent overlappings, between public interest
actions and class actions are ably analyzed by Professor Homburger in Private Suits at
387-89.
109. See Section I supra.
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of judicial discretion. 110 In particular, it is for the court to ascertain
whether the class suitor is actually a member of a class, whether he
acts for the general benefit of the class, and whether he is an "adequate,"
albeit self-appointed, representative of the class.
Thus, the class action represents another fascinating illustration of
the combination of private initiative and public (court) control. It
may well be, of course, that the combination could still be improved
and that not all the possible abuses have been taken into account by
statutory limitations and court supervision. Indeed, I want to make it
clear that I am by no means an unconditional enthusiast of class actions;
the class action is an extremely valuable instrument only if accompanied
by adequate controls."- With this proviso, however, an outsider's appraisal can only be essentially favorable to this American institution.

In fact, I do not know of any serious evaluation by non-American experts which has not been favorable,"

2

even though doubts sometimes

may have been cast on the feasibility of importing the American solution to other parts of the world." 3 This is the reason why recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which seem to have interrupted the steady progress of American jurisprudence in this area, are
cause for concern to the civilian observer. The institutional and procedural difficulties, problems, and inadequacies which have been, and in
110.

On the broad judicial discretion in class actions, see, e.g., Weinstein, supra

note 1, at 302. Justice Black, in fact, in response to this increase in judicial discretion
in class actions, opposed the adoption of the amendments to rule 23 in 1966, stating as
follows: "It seems to me that they place too much power in the hands of the trial
judges and that the rules might almost as well simply provide that class suits can be
maintained either for or against particular groups whenever in the discretion of the
judge he thinks it wise." Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 383 U.S. 1029, 1035 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
111. Controls, however, should not be confused with formalistic limitations (e.g.,
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)) and with requirements susceptible of either eliminating the very possibility of class litigation in vital areas (e.g., Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)) or of depriving the class action of its
needed impact, as would be the case if, for instance, the condemnation of the fluid
recovery concept by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), should become the law. See Section VII infra, and
in particular note 160 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., T. Kojima, supra note 42, at 18-27; K6tz, supra note 5, at 78-88;
Taruffo, I limiti soggettivi del giudicato e le "class actions," 24 RIViSTA DI DIRITTO
PROCESSUALE 609, 631-36 (1969).
113. See T. Kojima, supra note 42, at 21-23; K6tz, supra note 5, at 86-88.
Professor K itz has suggested that the absence of the contingent fee system outside the
United States particularly hinders the development of class actions. See K6tz, supra
note 5, at 87. This suggestion, however, is not convincing since, even without a contingent fee system, there can be other financial inducements to a class suitor and his
lawyers. See Comparative Study at 875 n.365, 878-79 n.380.
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part continue to be, faced by the civil law world in assuring effective
representation of meta-individual interests had been met in America
by a solution which, on the whole, appeared optimal to non-Americans.
Therefore, outsiders have frequently regarded the American experience with class actions, particularly in civil and welfare rights and in
environmental and consumer protection, as an appealing model for
civil law countries trying to overcome the difficulties and the inadequacies which have remained despite the first reforms that have been
made.
Indeed, it should be emphasized that this is perhaps the real message for the common law world, and particularly the United States, to
draw from the civil law experience with public interest litigation: a
retreat from the relatively advanced position taken by American jurisprudence in the past few decades may ultimately mean falling back onto
ground which the civil law world has found, through painful experience, to be insufficient, inadequate, and-as measured by the comparative yardstick-unjust, since it is incapable of providing an effective
means of asserting the most important of contemporary interests.
At this point, however, it seems fair to add that, notwithstanding
the latest developments in the United States, advocating the collective
interest may still be relatively easier and have a greater impact in
American courts than in most courts of civil law nations. At least three
114
reasons for this fact may be cited.
First, public interest law firms, virtually unknown in other countries, have become increasingly important and respected in the United
States. 11 This phenomenon has blossomed to the point that the American Bar Association in recent years has switched from a position of
hostility to one of affirming a general responsibility of the legal profession "to provide public interest legal services."" 0 Despite the 1975
114. It should also be noted that, notwithstanding recent American decisions such
as those mentioned in note 23 supra, standing requirements today are not major barriers
in most public interest litigation in the United States, in contrast to much of the civil
law world. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
115. See, e.g., C. Halpern, supra note 50, at 8-10; Green, supra note 56. For a
useful survey of the role of public interest lawyers in the United States, and the likely
future of that role, see Ford Foundation, The Public Interest Law Program-Five Years
Later, October 1975 (unpublished manuscript).
Even in the United States this phenomenon is of very recent origin, if it is true
that, as remarked by United States Senator Edward Kennedy, as recently as 1970
"almost the entire public interest bar of Washington [could be fit] around a single
table." Green, supra note 56, at 20-21.
116. American Bar Association, Special Committee on Public Interest Practice,
Recommendations, adopted in Montreal by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in August, 1975. See 61 A.B.A.J. 1084 (1975).
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United States Supreme Court decision in Alyeska Pipeline,117 it may
still be easier in America to find a qualified public interest lawyer willing to charge no fee than it is elsewhere in the world. 118
Second, it should be noted that, notwithstanding the recent hostility of the Supreme Court and other federal courts toward public interest litigation and the institution of the "private attorney general," a
brighter picture is perhaps on the horizon. Recent New York legislation on class actions, effective since September 1, 1975," 9 best exempli117. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See note 6 supra. It should be noted, however, that
a number of federal laws still permit the awarding of attorneys fees to a prevailing
plaintiff enforcing the law. This is the case for violations of the antitrust laws, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 a-3(b)
(1970), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(k) (1970); the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 h-2(d) (1970); the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612(c) (1970);. the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); the
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (Supp. II 1972); the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970); and the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. III 1973). While these laws cover a number
of important public interest areas, they do not cover the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970), or the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. .§ 185 (1970), under which authority the plaintiffs in the
Alyeska Pipeline case sought to enjoin (and did temporarily enjoin) the construction
of the Alaska Pipeline.
There is, of course, still the possibility of further congressional action to expand
the list of areas where the prevailing "public interest" plaintiff can collect attorneys'
fees from the defendant. Legislation has been introduced permitting attorneys' fees in
actions under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 (H.R. 7825, 8218), actions for
injunctive relief under the Clayton Act (H.R. 7827, 8219), civil rights actions (H.R.
7828, 8220, 7968, 8743), actions under the National Environmental Protection Act
(H.R. 7829, 8222), suits for the review of administrative action (H.R. 7968, 8742),
and actions generally in the interests of justice (H.R. 7826, 8221) (all 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975)).
118. See R. Buxbaum, Report of Conference [held in Bonn, Germany, August
22-24, 1973] on Comparative Legal and Institutional Aspects of Public Interest Activity
in the Environmental Sector 12-17, November 23, 1973 (unpublished manuscript on
file at the University of Florence Institute of Comparative Law). See also note 113
supra; ComparativeStudy at 878-79 n.380.
119. N.Y. Civ. P- c. LAW §§ 901-06, Rules 907-09 (McKinney Supp. 1976)
[hereinafter New York Civil Practice Law and Rules will be cited as N.Y. CPLR].
This exceptionally interesting statute deserves to be set out in full (emphasis added):
§ 901. Prerequisites to a class action.
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and
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5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.
b. Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action,
an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.
§ 902. Order allowing class action.
Within sixty days after the time to serve a responsive peading has expired for all persons named as defendants in an action brought as a class
action, the plaintiff shall move for an order to determine whether it is to be
so maintained. An order under this section may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits on the court's own
motion or on motion of the parties. The action may be maintained as a
class action only if the court finds that the prerequisites under section 901
have been satisfied. Among the matters which the court shall consider in
determining whether the action may proceed as a class action are:
1. The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
2. The impracticability or inefficiency of prosecuting or defending separate actions;
3. The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class;
4. The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claim in the particular forum;
5. The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
§ 903. Description of class.
The order permitting a class action shall describe the class. When
appropriate the court may limit the class to those members who do not request
exclusion from the class within a specified time after notice.
§ 904. Notice of class action.
(a) In class actions brought primarily for injunctive or declaratory relief,
notice of the pendency of the action need not be given to the class unless
the court finds that notice is necessary to protect the interests of the represented parties and that the cost of notice will not prevent the action from
going forward.
(b) In all other class actions, reasonable notice of the commencement
of a class action shall be given to the class in such manner as the court
directs.
(c) The content of the notice shall be subject to court approval. In
determining the method by which notice is to be given, the court shall
consider
I. the cost of giving notice by each method considered
II. the resources of the parties and
III. the stake of each represented member of the class and the likelihood
that significant numbers of represented members would desire to exclude
themselves from the class or to appear individually, which may be determined,
in the court's discretion, by sending notice to a random sample of the class.
(d) I. Preliminary determination of expenses of notification. Unless the
court orders otherwise, the plaintiff shall bear the expense of notification.
The court may, if justice requires, require that the defendant bear the expense
of notification, or may require each of them to bear a part of the expense
in proportion to the likelihood that each will prevail upon the merits. The
court may hold a preliminary hearing to determine how the costs of notice
should be apportioned.
II. Final determination. Upon termination of the action by order or judgment the court may, but shall not be required to, allow to the prevailing party
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20
fies an encouraging trend which has begun to appear in state systems.

the expenses of notification as taxable disbursements under article eighty-three
of the civil practice law and rules.
§ 905. Judgment.
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action, whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
§ 906. Actions conducted partially as class actions.
When appropriate,
1. an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect
to particular issues, or
2. a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as
a class.
The provisions of this article shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.
Rule 907. Orders in conduct of class actions.
In the conduct of class actions the court may make appropriate orders:
1. determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or
argument;
2. requiring, for the protection of the members of the class, or otherwise
for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action,
or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members
to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, or to
appear and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
3. imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors;
4. requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed
accordingly;
5. directing that a money judgment favorable to the class be paid either
in one sum, whether forthwith or within such period as the court may fix, or
in such installments as the court may specify;
6. dealing with similar procedural matters.
The orders may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to
time.
Rule 908. Dismissal, discontinuance or compromise.
A class action shall not be dismissed, discontinued, or compromised without the approval of the court. Notice of the proposed dismissal, discontinuance, or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
Rule 909. Attorneys' fees.
If a judgment in an action maintained as a class action is rendered in
favor of the class, the court in its discretion may award attorneys' fees to
the representatives of the class based on the reasonable value of legal services
rendered and if justice requires, allow recovery of the amount awarded from
the opponent of the class.
See also Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust, 35 N.Y.2d 147, 316 N.E.2d 320, 359
N.Y.S.2d 28 (1974), which considerably liberalized class action requirements in New
York prior to the enactment of the new law.
120. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 52, at 417-18, and the references to California
decisions in notes 8-10 therein. Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court may have
retreated from its advanced position relative to class actions. See San Jose v. Superior
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974) (with a strong
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While preserving the basic features of the federal class action rule 23,
the New York law allows in that state precisely what the holdings of
Eisen and Alycska Pipeline took away at the federal level. 12 ' Indeed,
other recent New York legislation addresses the Supreme Court holdings in United States v. Richardson122 and Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War1 23 as well.

24

Professor Homburger, who is rec-

ognized as the principal draftsman of the New York class action statute, 25 describes this development as follows:
The need for effective group and public remedies in the United
States is overwhelming. In view of the gradual attrition of public
interest litigation in the federal courts under the harsh command of
the Supreme Court, it is gratifying that we may perhaps expect a
12 6
compensating upsurge in the states.
dissent by Tobriner, J.). The California Supreme Court, in addition, is facing the important issue of attorneys' fees to private attorneys general in Serrano v. Priest, L.A.
No. 30398, hearing granted, September 29, 1975.
Besides California, there is growing evidence of an increasing concern for liberal
state class action reform. See, e.g., Donne & Van Horn, Pennsylvania Class Actions:
The Future in Light of Recent Restrictions on Federal Access?, 78 DcxK. L. REv. 460
(1974); Comment, Federal and State Class Actions: Developments and Opportunities,
46 Miss. L.J. 39 (1975); Note, Class Actions in Illinois: A Viable Alternative to
Federal Rule 23, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J. 113 (1974); Note, State Class Actions: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 60 IowA L. REv. 93 (1974).
121. First, with respect to the holdings by the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the New York law (a) does not "require individual
notice [in common question actions] to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort." See N.Y. CPLR § 904(c) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (set out in note
119 supra); (b) allows notice requirements to be tailored to the plaintiff's resources and
the hardship of the costs. N.Y. CPLR § 904(c) ; and (c) in certain instances allows costs
to be imposed initially on the defendant after a preliminary hearing. Id. § 904(d).
Second, with respect to the holding in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness
Society, it allows the court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to the class attorneys. N.Y. CPLR R. 909.
122. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
123. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

124. See N.Y.

STATE- FIN. LAW

§§ 123-123j (MeKinney Supp. 1975). This law,

effective September 1, 1975, allows citizen-taxpayer suits in the State of New York, and
even provides for the establishment of a common fund for the payment of attorneys'
fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Id. §§ 123gh.
The catalyst for the enactment of this law was a New York Court of Appeals

decision of July 2, 1975, in the case of Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 334
N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1975),

which judicially overruled prior New York

law, thus allowing taxpayers "to challenge enactments of our State Legislature as
contrary to the mandates of our State Constitution." Id. at 362, 334 N.E.2d at 580,
372 N.Y.S.2d at 624. Prior to that decision, New York had been one of the few

states failing to recognize taxpayer suits. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§2 22.09, 22.10 (1958) ; cf. Private Suits at 390 & nn.212-13.

TREATISr

125. The 1975 statute is a slightly modified version of a model statute drafted by
Professor Homburger five years ago. See Homburger, supra, note 106, at 609, 655-57.
126. Letter to the author from Professor Adolf Homburger, October 31, 1975.
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Third, it should not be overlooked that, despite the present limitations at the federal level, class actions in the United States still represent
forceful instruments and retain a great potential for serving public
interest purposes.

VI. SPECIAL OBSTACLES TO CLASS AND PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES AND TRENDS

TOWARD SURMOUNTING THESE OBSTACLES

In contrast with the United States, basic features of the Continental European tradition place special and formidable obstacles in the
way of introducing devices similar to class and public interest actions.

A. The Orientationof Civil Law Judges
In addition to a still prevailing individualistic conception of civil
procedure-with all the corollaries already discussed, especially in the
area of locus standi-there is the fact that civil law judges, typically

bureaucratic "career judges," are less suited than their American counterparts to handle a type of adjudication that reaches far beyond the
parties "present" in the proceeding. 127 Of course, American judges are
also often reluctant to assume this broad judicial role, 28 and this explains, in part, the recent backlash against class and public interest
litigation. But the education and training of civil law judges, rooted
in many layers of civil law history and in a rigid conception of separation of powers, makes them even more wary of too evident manifesta29
tions of law-making through the courts.1

127. See, e.g., R. BUXBAUM, DIE PRIVATE KLAGE ALS MITTEL ZUR DURCHSETZUNG
WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHER RECHTSNORMEN 26, 32 (1972)
(Karlsruhe, Mfiller).
128.

See, e.g., note 162 infra.
129. For two studies by leading European proceduralists of a modern-evolution
departing substantially from the tradition, see Baur, Sozialer Ausgleich durch Richterspruch, 1957 JURISTENZEITUNG 193; Calamandrei, La funzione della giurisprudenza
nel tempo presente, 9 RmsTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 252 (1955),

republished in P. CALAMANDREI, 1 OPERE GIURMICHE 598 (M. Cappelletti ed. 1965)
(Naples, Morano). See also M. CAPPELLETTI, 3. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 195-97, 203-06, 249-77 (1967)
(Stanford, Cal., Stanford Univ. Press);
M. CAPPELLETTI, PROCESO IDEOLOGiAS, SOCIEDAD 365-452, 566-70 (1974) (Buenos
Aires, Ediciones Jurldicas Europa-Amfrica); Cappelletti, L'attivitt e i poteri del
giudice costituzionale in rapporto con illoro fine generico, in 3 SCRITTI GIURIDICI IN
.MEMORIA DI

PmRO

CALAMANDREI 83

(1958) (Padua, Cedam).
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B. The Revolutionary Tradition Against "Intermediate Societies"
There is still another obstacle' 8 0 which is of extraordinary importance, even though there are now signs that it is being gradually overcome in civil law nations. This obstacle consists of a traditional reluctance to accept groups united to further a common interest.
Many class and public interest actions in America have been
brought by private groups and spontaneous organizations created to
represent otherwise unorganized interests: civil rights associations,
environmentalists' and consumers' organizations, and last, but not
least, public interest lawyers organized in larger or smaller groups.'"8
Similarly, relator actions in England, Australia, and other common
law countries have been brought by private groups and organizations
acting for the general public interest or for the interest of one sector
of the public,132 rather than by isolated individuals or aggregates of
non-organized individuals. The fact is that even the most liberal granting of standing to individuals would be an insufficient solution to the
problem of asserting diffuse rights if the "private attorneys general"
33
were not allowed to associate and fight as an organized group.
This very fact, however, constitutes an additional obstacle for the
representation of meta-individual interests in civil law courts. It should
be recalled that among the principal targets of the great bourgeois revolution initiated in France in 1789, and which later spread over much
of Continental Europe, were the "corps intermddiaries"-theorganizations intermediate between the individual and the state, which were
identified with the feudal structure of the ancien rdgime. As Max
Rheinstein put it: "With eighteenth century Enlightenment the individualizing view of society began to be preponderant. In the French
Revolution the new ideology became official.... The state was now
clearly conceived to be composed of individual citizens. The inter130. Still other obstacles are mentioned in note 113 supra, and in Comparative
Study at 864-65 (problems of the conception of a civil action, the structure and
mentality of a career judiciary, and the mechanics of allowing group representation)
and at 873-75 & nn.361-63 (problems in the Eastern European socialist countries). See
generally id. at 878 n.380.
131. See note 115 supra. On the advantages of ongoing organizations in the
American legal system, see Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, supra note 3, at 143.
132. See note 97 supra.
133. This phenomenon has been defined as the "organizational private attorney
general" (as contrasted with the "individual attorney general") in Comparative Study
at 856-80, where its growing importance in both the Western and the socialist nations
is analyzed:
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mediate groups of manor, guild, estate, province were swept away
"134

Of course, this initial attitude of hostility and distrust vis-4-vis
"intermediate societies" soon had to come to grips with the very profound changes of European societies in the post-Revolution epoch. Industrialization, in particular, brought about the need for articulate
organization of both capital and the emerging labor class. Yet, the
resistance against the new was strong. In France, for instance, it was
only in 1884 that labor unions were definitively recognized as legitimate
entities. 135
Legal fictions were frequently used to adapt the existing law to
the new social needs. A "legal personality," for instance, was fictitiously
attributed to partnerships, corporations, and professional associations;
thus, the principle that only individual "persons"-natural or legalcan be participants in the legal and judicial processes was preserved.
At least two problems, however, still remain largely unsolved:
first, the problem of the legal status of non-"personalized," unincorporated, de facto associations and other organizations; second, the problem
of organizations (incorporated or not) seeking access to court not to
protect their own rights, as in the case of a trade union or a political
party claiming damages for the pillage of its own premises, 136 but rather
to protect the rights of their members or the collective rights of classes
or groups that the organizations purport to represent. 3 7 The first prob134. Rheinstein, The Family and the Law, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
3, 13 (A. Chloros ed. 1974) (Tilbingen/The Hague, Mohr/
Mouton). According to one commentator, "traditionally, French law looks with mistrust at the [intermediate] groups: the old execration by Rousseau vis-i-vis the intermediate societies-which disrupt the relationships between the Sovereign and the citizens
and impede the formation of the general will (volontg gingrale)-joins with the fear
by the state of seeing the groups compete with its activities and create new feudalities."
De Soto, L'individualisme dans la jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat, in 2 MiLANGES
OFFERTS 2 MARCEL WALINE: Ln JUGE ET LE DROIT PUBLIC 759, 771 (1974). See also, e.g.,
Bihl, supra note 15, at 525; Dupeyron, L'cction collective, 1952 RECUEIL DALLOZ,
CHRONIQUE 153, 155.
135. See 1 H. SOLUS & R. PERROT, supra note 14, at 223.
136. For this example, based on French law, see id. at 219; Perrot, L'action en
justice des syndicats pro!essionnels, des associations et des ordres professionnels, 10
OF COMPARATIvE LAw

ANNALES

UNIVERSITATIS

SCIENTIARUm

BUDAPESTINENSIS

DE ROLANDO

EOTvOs

Noms-

99, 100 (1969).
137. An example, again based on French law, could be an association of doctors,
claiming to represent the general interests of the medical profession, bringing suit
against persons abusively exercising that profession. See 1 H. SOLUS & R. PERROT, supra
note 14, at 220; Perrot, supra note 136, at 100.
xATAt
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lem cannot be dealt with here. 18 The second, however, must be discussed, since it is central to any study of modern public interest advocacy in the courts.
C. The Rise and Proliferationof New "IntermediateSocieties" Acting
as "OrganizationalPrivateAttorneys General": Ideological Parties
and the Danger of a "Return to Feudalism"
New groups have been rising and proliferating in recent times to
fight the new menaces of our epoch-the tyranny of racial, religious,
and political majorities, the oppressions of the modern corporate society,
the red tape of bureaucracies, the blind selfishness of producers and
polluters. The essential aim of these groups is not to protect rights "belonging" to them, but rather to represent the aggregate of many "small
rights" and the diffuse "rights without a holder"-the "newer property."
Their very essence is-to borrow from a widely accepted definition by
Louis Jaffe-to act as "ideological," not as "Hohfeldian," plaintiffs;13
in other words, to act for the public good as "organized private attorneys
general."' 4 0 Should they not be allowed to so act, their very reason for
being would disappear.
Of course, this development, unprecedented in its size and impact,
is not itself without dangers. Opponents have described it as a dreadful
"return to feudalism,"'1 41 and undoubtedly new abuses and tyrannies
can grow out of it. Labor unions, political parties, national and transnational corporations, and professional organizations can themselves
become fearful centers of oppression against both their members and
third parties. 14 Abuses can be, and have been, perpetrated even by
less pervasive groupings, such as consumer associations acting for selfish
44
purposes, 43 unable to see beyond the interests of limited groups.'
138. For a brief discussion and references, see Comparative Study at 861-62
& nn.304-06.
139. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
140. See note 133 supra.
141. See, e.g., De Soto, supra note 134.
142. See, e.g., S. ERHLICH, LE POUVOIR ET LES OROUPES DE PRESSION (1971)
(Paris/The Hague, Mouton); M. HORKHEIMER, THE ECLIPSE OF REASON 128, 141-48
(1947) (New York, Oxford Univ. Press).
143. For some examples of such abuses, see N. TROCKER, PROCESSO CIVILE n
COSTITUZIONE 214 & n.100 (1974) (Milan, Giuffr ).
144. As noted by Green, public interest lawyers have been denounced on the
grounds that, "given the current unresponsiveness of the political system to ethnic
minorities, the allocation of public interest law resources to majoritarian, middle-class,
white concerns is contrary to the public interest." Green, supra note 56, at 22.
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And, legal instruments valuable per se, such as class actions, have
sometimes been used as tools of blackmail. 145
This is the reason why public checks and controls, those very kinds
of checks and controls that characterize the "multiple" or "combined"
solutions discussed above, are particularly vital. Recall that such controls are entrusted to the attorney general in the English relator action,
to the judge in the American class action, and to the ministhre public
in the actions brought in France by consumer associations. 1 46
Neither the dangers of abuse nor the tenacity of traditionalism,
however, seem able to stop the grand movement. Newer and newer
intermediate organizations have been arising, even in civil law countries. Since their reason for being is to act as "ideological plaintiffs,"
they have been struggling to overcome-both through court interpretation and legislative intervention-the obstacles deriving from the
traditional law. France, Germany, and Italy can again provide instructive illustrations. As early as 1913, a landmark decision by the French
Cour de cassation, confirmed in 1920 by legislation, recognized the
power of labor unions and other syndicats professionnels to represent
in court the "collective interest of the association"; 47 and, as discussed
earlier, recent French 4" and German 49 statutes have granted standing to private organizations to sue for the diffuse interests of consumers
and racial minorities. In Italy, a 1973 decision by the Supreme Administrative Court, breaking an uninterrupted "Hohfeldian" tradition of
that court, granted standing to a private environmental association
145. It seems, however, that the phenomenon of abuse of class and public interest
litigation has been less frequent than certain critics would allege. See GLASS ACTION
STUDY, supra note 1, at 9, 22-23. See also Weinstein, supra note 1, at 299-306.
146. See Section IV C supra; notes 84-114 supra and accompanying text.
147. Decision of April 5, 1913, [1914] D.P. I. 65 (Cass. ch. r6un.); see 1 H.
SOLUS & R. PERROT, supra note 14, at 225-26; J. VINCENT, PROCiDURE CIVILE 43 (17th
ed. 1974) (Paris, Dalloz); Audinet, La protection judiciaire des fins poursuivies par
les associations, 53 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT crvL 211, 213, 214, 223 (1955);
Bihl, supra note 15, at 524; Dupeyron, supra note 134, at 153-54; Vouin, De la recevabiliti de l'action "syndicale" des associations, 1955 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQuE, I-DoCTRINE 1207. See also Comparative Study at 862 & nn.307-08.
The statute confirming the decision is C: TRAVAIL, liv. III, art. 11 (law of March
12, 1920) ("[unions] can, before every court, exercise all the rights belonging to a
partie civile concerning situations that involve a violation, whether direct or indirect
of the collective interest of the profession they represent").
148. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text. After the adoption of the law
of March 12, 1920 (see note 147 supra), in the 1940's some other laws aimed in the same
direction, granting to certain associations in several areas standing to sue for the collective interest (e.g., hunting associations, leagues against alcohol abuse, associations for
the protection of the family). See BiMi, supra note 15, at 524.
149. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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called "Italia Nostra"-a European analogue of the "Sierra Club"1 to bring suit against the government for the "diffuse" interest of environmental conservation.'' Since the 1973 decision allowed "Italia
Nostra" to litigate as an organization rather than as a representative
of injured individuals, it went an important step beyond the 1972
doctrine of the United States Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.1 52

1 welcomed

the Italian decision as "a badly needed turning point

from a long period of unchecked spoliations of the Italian environment
and artistic heritage."' 53 Finally, in Germany, where the "Hohfeldian"
doctrine still prevails, especially in the administrative courts, an important departure, similar in content to that in Italy, even though not
yet at the supreme court level, also occurred in 1973. In a sensational
decision, the administrative court of Bavaria granted standing to an
environmental association that requested a court order to stay the construction of a hotel."

4

150. Italia Nostra, the "National Association for the Protection of the Historical,
Artistic and Natural Patrimony of the Nation," was founded in 1955 and, as of 1974,
had a membership of nearly 20,000 persons in Italy and 50,000 living outside of Italy.
Its purpose, according to its charter, is "to contribute to the protection of the historical,
artistic, and natural patrimony of the nation." It has been especially active in the
areas of environmental protection, urban planning, protection of works of art and
archeological sites in Italy, and preservation of important archives and libraries. For
this and further information, see A. Nicholson, Italia Nostra and Problems of Standing
in Italian Public Interest Litigation in the Environmental Sector 3-10, June 1974 (un-published paper, on file at the Florence Institute of Comparative Law).
15 1. Decision of March 9, 1973, No. 253, [1974] Foro Ital. III 33, 49 Foro Atom.
261 (§ II) (Consiglio di Stato). The decision gave Italia Nostra standing to challenge
the lawfulness of an administrative act of the province of Trento on the ground that
the act authorizing construction of a road through a park was illegal.
152. 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (denying standing to the Sierra Club on the grounds
that the Sierra Club failed to allege that it or any of its members had been or would
be injured by the conversion of a game reserve into a privately operated resort). In
-contrast, the Italia Nostra decision granted standing to the organization as a representative of the public interest, not merely that of itself or its members.
153. See Comparative Study at 864.
At least one more recent decision of the Consiglio di Stato, however, casts doubt on
-the issue of whether Italy will continue the positive trend in standing. In Decision of
November 13, 1973, No. 829, [1974] Foro Ital. III 262-64 (Consiglio di Stato), it
-denied standing to the Association of Venician Gondoliers to challenge the closing of
several canals in Venice.
154. Bayerischer Verwaltungsgeriehtshof, Decision of February 2, 1973, [1973]
BAYnERiscH VERWALTUNGSBLXTTER 211; see Comparative Study at 863-64 n.316.
As for France, it should be said that, unlike Italy and Germany, the juris-prudence of the Conseil d'Etat-that country's supreme administrative court-has consistently allowed broad standing to groups to challenge administrative decisions. J. M.
Auny & R. DRAOO, TRATrr DU CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIIP 450-88, especially §§ 1040,
1042 (1975) (Paris, Librairie G6n6rale de Droit et de Jurisprudence).
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VII.

FEATURES AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

OF

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

The gradual rise and growth of the "ideological plaintiff" in both
civil law and common law countries is, of course, a multifaceted phenomenon. Only a few aspects of it could be examined here, but other
aspects are no less important. 15 5 Two of them will be touched upon,
very briefly, in the remainder of this article. One is the new role of
the judge in public and group interest litigation. The other is the problem of due process and, more generally, of preserving the right to a
fair hearing for those involved in such litigation.
A. The Role of the Judge
Traditionally, the role of the civil judge has been determined by
the individualistic character and private content of civil litigation. The
court's task has been to restore to the aggrieved party the enjoyment of
his own rights vis-4-vis his adversary; consequently, the direct effects of
a judicial decision were not to reach beyond the sphere of the actual
parties in the proceeding.
In the case of the new actions collectives 56 or public interest
actions, however, the traditional "privatistic" schemes are clearly inadequate. By definition, the plaintiff does not sue merely for himself,
but for the collectivity, for a class or subclass of persons; it is the class,
not merely the party, that has to be restored to the enjoyment of its
"collective right." As a consequence, both the duties of the ideological
party and the controlling responsibility of the court become more intense. On the one hand, the party cannot freely "dispose" of the collective right in issue; on the other, the judge is responsible for insuring
that the party's procedural behavior is, and remains throughout the
proceeding, that of an "adequate champion" of the public cause. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure express, in part, this idea by providing
that in both class actions and shareholders' derivative actions the "approval" of the court is necessary for the action to be "dismissed or compromised.' ' 57 As Professor Homburger correctly put it:
The most distinctive feature of class litigation . . .may be the

uncommonly active role which the judge must play in the control
and supervision of the proceedings. The public interest in the prosecu155.
156.

On the institution of the amicus curiae, see note 103 supra.
For this expressive French terminology, see, for example, Dupeyron, supra

note 134, at 153.
157.

FED. R. Cry. P. 23(e), 23.1.
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tion of a class action is far greater than in ordinary civil litigation.
It is the court's function to protect that interest as well as the interests of the absent members of the class. The successful management
of a class action, therefore, requires a procedure that leans more
toward court-prosecution than ordinarily is the case in the American
1 58
system.
Also, and again by definition, the effects of judicial decisions

rendered in public interest litigation must go beyond the sphere of
the parties actually present in the proceedings. The traditional principle that res judicata effects are limited to the actual litigants, a principle that someone has called "the last refuge of individualism" in
civil litigation,15 9 simply cannot prevail if diffuse rights are to be protected by the courts. Even such admittedly unorthodox concepts as that
of "fluid recovery," so strongly condemned by the Court of Appeals of
the Second Circuit in its review of Eisen,'6 0 does not appear to be out
of line in this light, since the ideological plaintiff is not suing merely
to have his own damage restored, but rather to have the wrongdoer

provide indemnification for all the damage he has caused to the group,
the class, or society as a whole. 16' The larger polluter, for instance,
158.

Private Suits at 349.

Aside from the examples discussed below (see notes 160-62, 180-85 infra and accompanying text), rather striking illustrations of judicial activism and control are given
in Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Decree Ordering Institutional Change,
84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1340-47 (1975). With respect to class and public interest actions,
the note discusses special masters, receivers, monitors, committees, and even ombudsmen
set up by judges to supervise implementation of their decrees. To insure compliance
with a decree, the judges thus create their own supervisory institutions, rather than
simply relying on the usual method of complaints by one of the adversary parties.
159. See U. ROMiAGNOLI, LE ASSOCIAZIONI SINDACALI NEL PROCESSO 36 (1969)
(Milan, Giuffr ). The traditional principle is expressed in the well-known Latin "res
inter alios iudicata alteri non nocet nec prodest."
160. 479 F.2d 1005, 1014-18 (2d Cir. 1973). See also note 6 supra. The Supreme
Court, however, in its holding in the Eisen case, made no ruling on the suitability of
the fluid recovery concept. 417 U.S. at 172 n.10.
For a brief but penetrating analysis of French concepts comparable to that of a
"fluid recovery," see Dupeyron, supra note 134, at 154-55.
161. In the field of diffuse rights, recovery should tend to cover the total
damages caused by the defendant, rather than merely the damages suffered by the
plaintiff. The concept of fluid recovery is one manifestation of this idea; rejecting that
concept would imply rejection of one essential feature of effective protection of diffuse
rights. Cf., e.g., Scott, supra note 52, at 414-15. Indeed, a focus on the total damages
caused by the injurer, rather than on individuals who are damaged, increases the likelihood that an economically "optimal" level of the injury-causing activity will be reached.
As Professor Calabresi has pointed out, what matters from an economic viewpoint is
not the compensation of individuals, but the assignment of the correct market value
to the injury-causing activity. G. CALABRESI, supra note 25, at 201-05.
Unfortunately, following the lead of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), most federal courts appear
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would hardly be forced to stop his wrongdoing should he merely be sued
by individual victims and only for the damage inflicted on one or
some of the myriad of affected persons. Clearly, a blind refusal to accept
such concepts as "fluid recovery" can be tantamount to an a priori refusal by the courts to provide for the effective defense of diffuse rights
-a strange attitude, indeed, if it is true that those rights are becoming
more and more important in all advanced societies, and that judicial
protection is the most trustworthy and sophisticated safeguard of legal
1 62
rights ever designed by human civilizations.
to reject the fluid recovery. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir.
1974) (recovery to users of 600 hotels would have been at best $6 per user) ; Al Barnett
& Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); Turoff v. Union
Oil Co. of Cal., 61 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ohio 1973). However, United States Congressman
Peter Rodino of New Jersey, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, has proposed
that a "parens patriae" bill be enacted for antitrust claims, in part to rectify this
problem. H.R. 38, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). It would allow a state attorney general
to sue under the federal antitrust laws to recover the reasonably estimated aggregate
damages sustained by the state's citizens. The damage fund would then be allocated
among the citizens either in a manner provided by state law or according to a plan developed by the federal district court; alternatively, the fund would escheat to the
state. The bill thus allows fluid recovery, but only when the state attorney general
brings suit.
The traditional concept of civil liability as limited to the damages suffered by the
plaintiff is shared by civil law and common law countries. See, e.g., Alston, supra note
96, at 307, 312 (1973), quoting the King's Bench opinion in Markt & Co. v. Knight
S.S. Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021, 1040-41:
[Djamages are personal only. To my mind no representative [class] action can lie
where the sole relief sought is damages, because they have to be proved
separately in the case of each plaintiff, and therefore the possibility of representation ceases.
However, that traditional concept has certainly been implemented in a more inflexible
way in civil law than in common law countries.
162. A most drastic expression of the attachment to traditional views of the
judicial role can be found in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180-96 (1974). The central points of the opinion are that
"relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of the judicial
power," and that such relaxation "would significantly alter the allocation of power at
the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government." Id. at
188. Justice Powell's concern about the expansion of the judicial power, however, apparently neglects that such expansion is but one facet of a general expansion of governmental power in modem times-of all branches of government. The ever increasing
powers of the legislative and executive branches justify and, indeed, necessitate a corresponding broadening of the judicial power in order to maintain a balanced system.
To be sure, a bourgeois "night watchman" view of government could go hand-in-hand
with a conception of judges limited to rendering justice in traditional, essentially individual, litigation. But the growth of the modern welfare government and the parallel
growth of socio-economic interdependence of groups, categories, and classes of citizens
call for a corresponding growth of the task of "judicial protection." As for the "shift
away" from democracy, an elementary awareness of sad historical experience should
suffice to convince that precisely the opposite is correct. A democratic government is
one in which citizens can have access to justice to vindicate legal rights-old and new,
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B. The Parties' Right to Be Heard: From Individual'to Social Due
Process
To be sure, resistance-even blind refusal-is perfectly comprehensible, even if not justifiable. At stake is not merely a question of
traditionalism and attachment to the "old"; serious problems are present in the new course.
The most apparent of these problems concerns the parties' right
to be heard, the most fundamental of all guarantees of a fair proceeding. The principle audi et alteram partem is sanctioned by the constitutions of many countries, including the United States, 8 and by
modem transnational bills of rights, such as the European Convention
of Human Rights, which is presently binding for eighteen nations.'"
Indeed, it is a most ancient aphorism of human wisdom that, as put
by Aristophanes 24 centuries ago, "a judgment shall not be made before the arguments of both sides are heard."u 65 How then can we accept
the fact that judgments rendered in public interest cases extend their
binding effects beyond the sphere of the actual litigants, possibly prejudicing"6 persons, and sometimes, legions of persons, who were not
individual and meta-individual-and one in which societal, including governmental,
legal duties can be judicially enforced, since judicial protection is what assures the
"rule of law." Also, democratic government is one in which people have a sense of
participation, a sense that distant legislatures and administrative apparatuses so frequently alienate. Judges, of course, can themselves become bureaucrats insulated from
society; however, the very fact that they are called daily to adjudicate concrete "cases
and controversies" is the powerful antidote against that danger. And public interest
litigation is no less litigation-no less "case and controversy"-than traditional two-

party litigation. See Jaffe, supra note 139.
163.

See the references in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL
449-52, 676-77 (M. Cappelletti & D. Tallon eds. 1973) (Milan/Dobbs
Ferry, New York, Giuffr6/Oceana) (United States). See also id. at 15-19, 677-79
(Federal Republic of Germany); id. at 548-51, 680-81 (Italy).
164. Art. 6, para. 1, Ist sentence, of the Convention establishes that: "In the
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
impartial tribunal established by law."
165. ARISTOPHANES, THE WASPS, lines 725-26
"i IP4o&
i
4 v Pr, Ji
oxp &,dmr".) See G. DEL VEccHIo, LA OIUSTIZIA 176 (4th ed. 1946) (Rome,
Studium) (1959). For the English translation, see G. DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE 172-73
n.13 (A. H. Campbell transl. & ed. 1952).
166. Prior to 1966, in so-called "spurious" class actions (analogous to actions
now brought under amended FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3)), the absent members of the
class were not bound by a judgment for the defendant, but could intervene and share
the benefits if the plaintiff prevailed. This system was termed "one-way intervention."
For an interesting discussion about whether the Supreme Court decision in Eisen
foreshadows a return to the "one-way intervention" system, see Dam, supra note 64, at
121-26.
LITIGATION
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given an effective opportunity to be heard? At first glance, an opinion
67
such as that rendered by the United States Supreme Court in Eisen
would seem perfectly correct, and perhaps even too liberal, since the
Court was willing to forego individual notice at least to those members
of the class who could not easily be identified.1 86 Strictly construed,
due process would seem to require that adequate notice, which is a
necessary ingredient of the right to be heard, 69 be given to all the individual members of the class who are to be affected by the decision. 70
This individualistic concept of a fair hearing, however, will soon
appear too rigid if measured against its practical consequences. Judicial
protection of diffuse rights, frequently involving large numbers of
persons, is often made impossible for all practical purposes by a strict
adherence to traditional notice and fair hearing requirements. In the
Eisen case, for instance, notice, even limited to identifiable persons,
would have cost the ideological plaintiff $225,000,171 clearly an impossible burden.1'2

167. See note 6 supra.
168. In fact, the decision prescribes individual notice only to the members of the
class identifiable through "reasonable effort," and is limited to rule 23(b) (3) actions.
In Eisen, this would still have left 4 million members of the class without individual
notice. See Bennett, supra note 64, at 813. Of course, the United States Supreme
Court in the Eisen case does not explicitly address itself to the constitutional, due
process aspects of notice in class actions, but merely to the statutory requirements of
rule 23(c) (2).
169. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), "This right to be heard has little
reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for
himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Other legal systems are in
agreement. The Italian Constitutional Court, for example, has stated that "Notice
is a necessary instrument of a fair hearing . ..

."

Decision of June 6, 1965, No. 57,

10 Giur. Cost. 717, 723 (Corte Costituzionale 1965). Although the decision concerned
a criminal case, its language clearly applied to civil matters as well. For Germany, see,
e.g., Constitutional Court, Decision of Feb. 1, 1967, No. 17, 21 BVerfG 132 (failure
to notify the father about a legitimacy hearing held to violate the right to be heard).
170. In the words of one commentator, "[The procedural device of the class
suit-any class suit-conflicts with the deep rooted principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that no one shall be bound by a judgment without having had an opportunity to litigate his own claim in his own way." Simeone, Procedural Problems of
Class Suits, 60 Mxcn:. L. Rav. 905, 944-45 (1960).
171. And this for postage alone. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D.
253, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Dam, supra note 64, at 103, 107.
172. One of the Eisen holdings by the Supreme Court was that the costs of notice,
absent a fiduciary relationship between the parties, must initially be borne by the
plaintiffs, with only the possibility of reimbursement if the plaintiffs prevail in the
lawsuit. 417 U.S. at 178. For the impact in general of this holding, cf., e.g., SENATE
COMM. ON COMMERCE, CLASS AcTIoN STUDY, supra note 1, at 26-27.
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Even the most sacred principles of "natural justice"'1 73 must therefore be reconsidered in view of the changed needs of contemporary
societies. Reconsideration, however, does not mean abandonment, but
rather adaptation. The old schemes of a merely individualistic "procedural guarantism" must be transformed in order to be adapted to
the new meta-individual rights; in other (and more American) terms,
an individualistic vision of procedural due process should give way to,
or be integrated with, a social or collective concept of due process,
since this is the only possible way to assure judicial vindication of the
new rights. Hence, the right to be heard must indeed be preserved
and guaranteed-not necessarily, however, to all the individual members
of the class, but to the ideological party. This party, if adequately
representative,'7 4 shall be allowed to act for the entire class, including
those members who are not identified, not served, in sum, not "heard"
in a strictly literal sense of that term. In fact, these members of the class
will have a better "day in court" if representative litigation is allowed
than if it is not, since, as a rule, they would simply be unable to go
75
to court individually.1
The problem, of course, is thus shifted, not resolved. What is
"adequate representation"? How can it be decided whether or not an
"ideological plaintiff" or "private attorney general" is honest, prepared,
and aggressive enough-in one word, whether he is "serious" enough 170
173. On the two rules of natural justice, i.e., nemo judex in causa sua (judicial
impartiality) and audi alteram partem (the right to be heard), see, for example, H.
MARSHALL,
NATURAL JUSTICE 3-20 (1959) (London, Sweet & Maxwell); S. Da
SMITH, supra note 98, at 134-245; Cappelletti, General Report, in FUNDABENTAL
GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 163, at 669-70.
174. On the concept that in class actions adequacy of representation should be
the essential due process requirement, see, for example, Miller, Problems of Giving
Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313-34 (1973); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975).
175. "It is a landmark in judicial sophistry to use the due process concept in the
name of protecting the interests of class members, to reject the only litigation procedure
capable of doing so." Scott, supra note 52, at 420, criticizing Judge Medina's holding
for the Second Circuit in the Eisen case.
This point is particularly apparent in such cases as Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part, sub. nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), where the class suitor represented
all the mentally retarded and mentally ill residents of Alabama involuntarily confined
in the state's public mental institutions, claiming that the state was denying them the
right to receive adequate treatment. Clearly, this "class" has a better day in court in
a system which allows representative litigation, than in a rigidly individualistic system.
For a discussion of the Wyatt case, see Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a
JudicialDecree OrderingInstitutionalChange, supra note 158.
176. See note 181 infra and accompanying text.
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-to be held adequately representative of an entire class or subclass?
How can negligence, abuse, and blackmail be prevented?
Some countries have tried to give a legislative answer to these
questions, at least in certain fields of public interest litigation. A French
loi of 1972,177 already mentioned, is an example in the field of representation of racial minorities, 178 and another example is provided by
a 1970 Italian statute in the field of labor disputes. 1 79 However, comparative analysis tends to demonstrate that it would be absurd to expect
legislation to provide complete and uniform answers to this problem.
A degree of judicial discretion and flexibility is unavoidable and even
desirable, especially at the present, still rudimentary phase of our experience in the public interest field. 80 Whereas in ordinary litigation
the "seriousness" of the plaintiff is generally assured by the traditional
limitation of standing to the person directly affected in his own rights,
in public interest litigation the judge must measure the plaintiff's
seriousness,' 8' and hence his adequacy as a representative, by means
of more various and variable yardsticks. These yardsticks may from
time to time include the past history of a plaintiff, 8 2 the internal
8
organization, the funding sources,

3

8
and the statutory objectives'

4

of

a private group, as well as the numerical and geographical size, and
the local or national character of a public interest organization. 8 5
Adopting a legislative and rigidly uniform solution would be like using
the axe of the woodsman to perform delicate surgery.
177. Statute No. 72-546 of July 1, 1972 ("concerning the fight against racism").
178. See note 81 supra.
179. Art. 28, para. 1 of the legge of May 20, 1970, No. 300 ("Statuto dei diritti
dei lavoratori"), establishing the requirements for labor unions to be granted standing to

sue in the collective interest of the workers against management for unfair labor
practices. See Comparative Study at 865-66 n.324.
180. See, e.g., id. at 866 n.326, outlining the interesting suggestion of three
German experts on environmental problems.
On the inevitable "role normatif" and "fonction cr~atrice" of the courts in fields,

such as environmental law, which are in a phase of rapid formation and transformation, see, for example, de Lanversin, Contribution du juge au diveloppement du droit
de l'environnement, in 2 MELANGES OFFERTS A MARCEL WALINE: LE JUGE ET LE
DROIT PUBLIC, supra note 134, at 519, 522, 525-29.
181. On this problem of the "serious" plaintiff in public interest litigation, see
the references in Comparative Study at 866 n.325.
182. Consider the five-year requirement for French associations against racism. See
note 81 supra.
183. See Comparative Study at 865 n.323.
184. Consider again the 1972 French loi. See note 81 supra.
185. See Comparative Study at 865-66 n.324. See also Audinet, supra note 147,
at 235, with particular reference to the formula, so important (even in Italy) in disputes concerning labor unions, of the "syndicat le plus repr~sentatif."

[Vol. 25

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
THE

ONGOING REVOLUTION IN THE
CIVIL LITIGATION:

A

LAW AND PRACTICE

OF

CONCLUSION

My first concluding remark is of a comparative nature. Recall the
civilian private law-public law dichotomy 186 and the historical cleavage between the individual and the state.' 8 7 These dichotomies, upon
which the inadequate "aggrieved individual" or "governmental agent"
scheme of standing is based, have never been as influential in the common law world, where the reactive effects of the French Revolution

against feudalism and "intermediate societies" were never deeply felt.
The United States, in particular, has always been rich in intermediate
societies, as Alexis de Tocqueville remarked with admiration almost
one and a half centuries ago. 88 These societies have frequently recognized their role in furthering the assertion of social and meta-individual
rights, and have utilized such devices as amicus curiae briefs, representative standing, and, perhaps most recently, group legal services.
American jurists may not be at the best vantage point to realize the
potential impact of recent decisions which undermine or obstruct the
effectiveness, and hence, as a by-product, sap the vitality, of such intermediate societies. That potential impact is to throw the burden of
asserting meta-individual rights back onto single individuals and government officials, the very scheme proven inadequate by the civil law experience.
In addition, the limitations on the power of the civil law judge
to award damages beyond those individually suffered 8 0 and, more
generally, his inability-again, for historical reasons-to construct creative and imaginative new remedies to effectuate diffuse rights have
never been, at least to the same degree, characteristic of the common
law world. The activism and imagination of common law judges in
"remedial law-making" has once again been a focus for admiration in
the civil law world. 190 Here too, however, and especially in an area
where this creative strength is most needed to protect new and important rights through new remedies, it is disturbing to see American
186. See notes 11-16 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
188.

A. Dn TocuuEvrLLE, DaOCRACY IN AMERICA 485-88

(J. Mayer & M.

Lerner eds. 1966) (New York, Harper & Row). "Americans of all ages, all stations in
life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations." Id. at 485.
189. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., A. PzcELIS, LAW AND SocIAL ACTION 42-74 (M. Konvitz ed.
1950) (Ithaca and New York, Cornell Univ. Press).
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developments now casting a long shadow upon such remedial innovations as fluid recovery. 191 Again, the common law jurist may perhaps
not fully realize the negative impact of restricting new, innovative
remedies in this area-an impact which forces reliance on traditional,
essentially individualistic remedies whose ineffectiveness for securing
meta-individual rights is demonstrated by the experience in the civil
law world.
My second, and last, concluding remark is of a more general nature.
Whatever the oscillations and whims of a particular time and place,
there are today basic developments and trends shared in common by
all modem societies.
Clearly, modem societies are witnessing the progressive decline of
a two-party, laissez-faire concept of civil justice, a decline forcefully announced in the United States as early as 1906 by Roscoe Pound. 9 2
Dean Pound's concern some 70 years ago, however, was essentially for
the inefficiency of the courts, the "exaggerations of the contentious procedure," and the need for a more activist judiciary to speed up litigation.198 Today, our concern is much more complex. New social rights
have emerged which only a few decades ago either were unknown or
were considered mere charities and nonjusticiable privileges. Goldberg v. Kelly 94 is an American milestone in this new development,
but similar developments have occurred in other countries as well,
through both legislation and adjudication. 95 A "new property"'" 6 has
emerged, and with it, a new role for the courts, 1 97 as well as the need
191. See notes 160-61 supra and accompanying text.
192. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
justice, 40 Am. L. REv. 729 (1906), republished in 8 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 6 (1956).
(Citations are to the latter.)
193. Id. In particular, see id. at 12-25.
194. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
195. See, e.g., M. CAPPELLETTI, PROCESSO E DEOLOGiE 511-24 (1969) (Bologna,

II Mulino); L.

ScARmAN,

ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION

28-50 (1974) (Lon-

don, Stevens & Sons); LA RECONNAISSANCE ET LA MISE EN OEUVRE DES DROITS ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIAlUX (1972)
(Brussels, Centre interuniversitaire de droit compar6).
196. According to the Supreme Court's ruling in Goldberg v. Kelly, "[s]uch
sources of security [as social security, governmental subsidies, long-term governmental
contracts, routes for airlines and channels for television], whether private or public, are
no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials fully
deserved, and in no sense a form of charity .. . ." 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. The Court
cited, inter alia, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), in which governmental benefits were first recognized as "new property."
197. On the new "active" and "social" role of the judge, which is dictated by
the modern equalitarian ideal of effective (rather than merely formal) access to justice
and by the need to place the parties on a more equal footing, see, e.g., Cappelletti,
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to reconsider and adapt old principles and structures of civil litigation
which have proven unsuitable to that new role.
This development is far from being concluded. An even newer
type of "property" has emerged, including those "rights without a
holder" that often share with social and welfare rights the need for
affirmative state action, but present further difficulties in being brought
to, and given adequate protection by, the courts.
I have tried to indicate some basic trends emerging in a growing
number of legal systems-both in the civil law and the common law
areas-in their effort to deal with these newest phenomena and needs.
We have seen that a turmoil, indeed a real revolution, is in progress,
in which even the most sacred ideas and themes of judicial law, such
as due process and the right to be heard, are being challenged.19 8 As
a consequence of that challenge, basic changes are gradually taking
place everywhere.
To be sure, advocating changes of traditional structures and longaccepted concepts is intellectually much more difficult than simply proposing their conservation. Such new concepts as "diffuse rights," "fluid
recovery," and the "ideological plaintiff" may admittedly appear dangerous, iconoclastic, and confusing. Yet, they reflect the unprecedented
complexity of contemporary realities. They require open analysis, not
blunt rejection. The contribution of this article, if any, is to show that
these new concepts represent not a development of merely local character, nor the ideological biases of limited groups in the United States
or elsewhere, but rather a deeply motivated, major trend of universal
dimensions.
Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure-Reforms and Trends in Western and
Eastern Europe, 69 MicH. L. REv. 847, 854-55 & n.38, 870-81, 883-84 (1971) and
references cited therein.
198. Indeed, the turmoil goes beyond the law of civil procedure, and includes
the very idea of the civil sanction, with important consequences in the fields of torts,
civil liability, and damages. Cf. Hazard, supra note 9, at 307; Weinstein, supra note 1,
at 303. See also notes 160-61 supra and accompanying text.

